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Summary findings
Using internationally comparable household data sets  gender to exacerbate the gap in educational outcornes. In
(Demographic and Health Surveys), Filmer investigates  India. for example, where there is a 2.5 percentage ponit
how gender and wealth interact to generate within-  difference between male and female enrollment  fcr
country inequalities in educational enrollment  and  children from the richest households, the difference is 34
attainmient. He carries out multivariate analysis to assess  percentage points for children from the poorest
the partial relationship between educational outcomes  households.
and gender, wealth, household characteristics (including  The education level of adults in the household has a
level of education of adults in the household), and  significant impact on the enrollment of children in all the
community characteristics (including the presence of  countries studied, even after controlling for wealth. TIhe
schools in the community). He finds that:  effect of the education level of adult females is larger
Women are at a great educational disadvantage in  than that of the education level of adult males in some,
countries in South Asia and North, Western, and Central  but not all, of the countries studied.
Africa.  *  The presence of a primary and a secondary school in
Gender gaps are large in a subset of countries, but  the community has a significant relationship with
wealth gaps are large in almost all of the countries  enrollment in some countries only (notablv in Western
studied. Moreover, in some countries where there is a  and Central Africa). The relationship appears not to
heavy female disadvantage in enrollment (Egypt, India,  systematically differ by children's gender.
Morocco, Niger, and Pakistan), wealth interacts with
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Paper prepared as background to, and with support from, a World Bank Policy Research Report
on Gender and Development  (http://www.worldbank.org/gcnder/prr).  This paper, and other
background papers to the report can be downloaded from http://www.worIlbank.ornig/clder/
piT/workingp.hti  .The Structure  of Social Disparities  in Education:  Gender  and Wealth1
I) Introduction
Universal  primary education  was enshrined  as a human  right in the United  Nation's
Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights in 1948.  Forty years  later the goal was still not in sight
and a call on donors and  governments to reaffirm their commitment  to universal  primary
enrollment  was part of the World Declaration  on Education  for All issued  in Jomtien,  Thailand in
1990.  The year 2000 was set as the target for achieving this  goal.  It is now  1999 and we are still
not near to achieving  universal primary  education - and as pointed  out dramatically  in a recent
report by Oxfam International  (1999) we do not appear to be closing  in on it.
This paper  uses a collection  of internationally  comparable  household  datasets to
investigate  the correlates  of educational  enrollment  and attainment  gaps within countries.  The
data from the Demographic  and Health Surveys (DHS) for 57 surveys in 41 countries  are used to
carry out country specific  analyses,  which  are comparable  across  countries.  Specifically,  the
effects of gender, household  wealth, the education  of adult household  members,  and the presence
of schools in the community on the educational  outcomes  of children  are assessed  in each
country and compared  across  countries.
Using household  based surveys allows the analysis to go beyond  comparing  country
aggregates  which  are reported  in several  large "international  databases"  (e.g. UNESCO  data or
derivatives thereof  such as Barro and Lee,  1993; Nehru,  Swanson  and Dubey,  1993; Dubey and
King,  1994; Ahuja  and Filmer,  1996).  The DHS have a drawback in that they lack data on
household  consumption  expenditures,  the usual variable used  to rank households  by their  socio-
'  This paper has benefited greatly from comments  from Jere Behrman, Jeff Hammer, Elizabeth  King, Julian
Lampietti, Andrew Mason, Lant Pritchett, Martin Ravallion, Jee-Peng Tan and participants at a workshop
on Gender and Development  in June 1999.  Errors are of course my own. Please see
http: /ww\.worldban]c.ortz/researcl/proiects/edattai  n/edattainhtmn  for more information  on education gaps
generated as a part of this project.
3economic standing. This analysis uses the results from Filmer and Pritchett (1998) which argued
that an index of housing characteristics  and assets owned by the household members, which are
collected in the DHS, is a good rneasure of a household's long run wealth in predicting
educational outcomes.
The particular goal here is to investigate  the association between educational disparities
and gender, household wealth, adult education, and "access" to schools. The analysis leads to
four main findings. First, the extent of the female disadvantage in education varies enorrnously
across countries. At one extreme there are some countries, primarily located in Western and
Central Africa, North Africa, and South Asia where the gaps are large in all the measures used.
For example, in India there is a 16.6 percentage  point difference between the school enrollment
of girls and boys aged 6 to 14. In Benin, the enrollment  rate of boys aged 6 to 14 is 63 percent
higher than the enrollment rate of girls. At the other extreme there are countries, mostly in Latin
America,  where there is no female disadvantage  in and in fact a small female advantage in some
of the measures used. In Colombia, the enrollment r ate of boys is 98 percent that of girls.
Second, while gender gaps are large in a subset of countries, wealth gaps are large in
almost all the countries studied. For example, in Senegal the enrollment of 6 to 14 year olds
from the poorest households is 52 percentage  points lower than for those from the richest
households. In Zambia, there is a 36 percentage  poilnt difference in the enrollment  rate of
children from the richest and poorest households. Disturbingly, in some countries where there is
a high degree of female disadvantage in enrollment, wealth interacts with gender to exacerbate
gaps in educational  enrollment among the poor (Niger, Egypt, Morocco,  India, and Pakistan).
The magnitude of this difference can be quite large. For example, in India there is a 2.5
percentage point difference in the enrollment  of male and female children from the richest
household whereas the difference is 34 percentage  points for children from the poorest
households.
4Third, the education of adults in the household has a significant relationship with the
enrollment of children in practically all the countries studied,  even after controlling for
household wealth. The results do not however confirm the notion that the education of adult
females is always more strongly related to the education of children that that of adult males.
While this is true in some countries, the story is complicated  and varies across countries. The
findings do however confirm that in a subset of countries with a large female disadvantage in
enrollment, the education of adult females has a larger impact on the enrollment of girls than that
of boys. This outcome is consistently  found in India, Nepal, and Pakistan.
Fourth, the presence of a primary and a secondary school in the community  has a
significant relationship to enrollment in some countries only (notably  the Western and Central
African countries). Moreover, the presence of a school does not appear to be differentially
related to the education of boys and girls in a systematic way across countries, even those with a
high female disadvantage in enrollment.
II) Data and methodological  approac
The data used in this paper are those collected as a part of the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS). These are large, nationally representative  household surveys, and the data from
57 surveys (from 41 countries) are analyzed here. 2 Basic information on the number of
households in each sample, as well as the number of individuals in the sample of 6 to 14 years
olds, and 15 to 19 year olds, are in Table 1. The DHS were not designed to collect information
on education. Rather, they were a systematic data collection effort whose main purpose was to
obtain  nationally representative and cross-nationally  comparable household-level data related to
2 There  are three  main  designs  of the survey  instrument.  DHS  I surveys  were  carried  out  between  1985  and
1989  and  do not contain  the requisite  education  data. DHS  II were  collected  between  1990  and 1993,  and
5family planning,  and maternal  and child health.  The more recent  surveys did record data on
school enrollment  (for household  members  aged 6 to 25) and educational  attainment  (for
household  members aged 6 and above) as reportecl by a chosen respondent.
Data  on education  outcomes
The education  variables  analyzed  here are based on the answers  to three questions  about
those aged 6 and above: whether  they had  ever been to school; if they had ever been to school,
what was the highest level  of schooling  attended;  and what was the highest  grade attained  at that
level.  Those  aged 6 to 25 were asked, in addition., whether  they were  still "in school"  (if they
report ever attending).  In the rest  of this paper, children who report  being "in school"  are
referred  to as being  enrolled.
The countries have been grouped into eight regions  for the analytical  purposes  of this
paper.  These  are, ranked roughly  from lowest to highest enrollment  of girls aged 6 to 14 from
the poorest  households:  Western  and Central  Africa, North  Africa,  South Asia, Eastern  and
Southern  Africa, Central  America  and the Caribbean,  East Asia and the Pacific,  South  America,
and Middle East and Central  Asia..
Measuring  wealth using DHS  data
The DHS do not ask about household  income  or consumption  expenditures,  the variables
usually used to rank households  according  to their standard  of living.  The surveys carried out
since 1990 do however  include  two sets of questions related  to the socio-economic  status of the
household.3 First, households  are asked to report about  ownership of various  assets,  such as
whether  any member owns a radio,  television,  refr-igerator, bicycle,  motorcycle,  or car.  Second,
DHS III are those that have been carried out since 1994 This analysis is limited to datasets with the
requisite education  and asset information.
3This  section relies heavily on information  contained  in Filmer and Pritchett (1998 and 1999a).
6questions  are asked about  housing characteristics,  namely whether  electricity  is used, the source
of drinking water, the type of toilet facilities, how many rooms there are for sleeping,  and the
type of materials  used in the construction  of the dwelling.  There is substantial  overlap  in the
questions  asked in different  countries,  but the precise  list varies.  The number of variables
derived from  these questions  is usually  15 or  16 but varies from 9 to 21 (shown  in the last
column of Table 1).4
In order to use these variables  to rank households  by their economic  status, they need to
be  aggregated  into an index, and a major problem  in constructing  such  an index  is choosing
appropriate  weights.5 This is done here using the statistical  technique  of principal  components.
Principal  components  is a technique  for summarizing the information  contained  in a large
number of variables  to a smaller  number by creating  a set of mutually uncorrelated  components
of the data.  Intuitively,  the first principal  component  is that linear index  of the underlying
variables  that captures  the most  common variation among them.
The details of the methodology  are described  and defended  in Filmer  and Pritchett
(1998) which  shows that the asset index performs  as well as a more traditional  measure,  such as
household-size-adjusted  consumption  expenditures,  in predicting  educational  enrollment  and
attainment.6 The methodology  was applied  in Filmer and Pritchett  (1999a) to analyze  wealth
4 A detailed description and assessment of the methodology  is in Filmer and Pritchett (1 999a). The
variables used in the construction  of the index are (in a typical case such as Mali): (1) a set of six dummy
variables equal to one if a member  owns each of a radio, refrigerator, television, bicycle, motorcycle,  or
car; (2) a set of three dummy  variables one of which is equal to one if the household's drinking water is
from a piped source, a well or surface source, or another source (rainwater,  tanker truck ...); (3) a set of
three dummy  variables one of which is equal to one if the household has a flush toilet, a pit toilet latrine, or
no/other toilet facilities; (4) a dummy  variable equal to one if the house has electricity;  (5) the number of
rooms for sleeping in the dwelling;  (6) a dummy  variable equal to one if the dwelling's floors are made of
finished materials  (such as cement, parquet, vinyl).
5  If these assets were only to be used to examine  the impact of some other  factor (e.g., maternal education)
as a "control" for wealth in a multivariate  regression  we would not need to aggregate the variables (cf.
Montgomery  et al. 1997)
6 While it is relatively  easy to interpret the first principal component,  an intuitive explanation  of the second
and higher order components  is more problematic. One generally hopes for only one factor with an eigen
value greater than 1,  the commonly  used cut-off value for "significant" components. In this case, although
the first eigen value is relatively  high, the second  eigen value is also generally above 1. This suggests that
7Table 1: Summary information of data used from DHS surveys
Sample sizes analyzed  Information on the creation  of the asset indexes
Proportion of
Number of  Number  of  variance  Difference
household  household  explained by  between  first  Number  of
Number of  members  members  first Principal  Value of first  and second  assets in
households  aged 6-14  aged 15-19  Component  eigen value  eigen values  wealth index
Benin 1993  4,499  7,604  2,459  0.268  4.3  2.7  16
Burkina Faso 1992-93  5,143  9,224  3,471  0.276  4.0  2.3  15
Cameroon 1991  3,358  5,121  1,997  0.247  3.8  2.0  15
C.A.R. 1994-95  5,551  7,092  2,513  0.240  3.8  2.0  16
Chad 1996  6,840  9,970  3,407  0.247  4.2  2.2  17
Cote d'lvoire 1994  5,935  9,B60  3,696  0.223  3.3  1.7  15
Ghana 1993  5,822  5,978  1,854  0.211  3.2  1.6  15
Mali 1995-96  8,716  13,236  4,053  0.230  3.4  1.4  15
Niger 1992  5,242  8,840  3,118  0.265  4.2  2.6  16
Niger 1997  5,242  9,516  3,454  0.265  4.2  2.6  16
Senegal 1992-93  3,528  8,303  3,181  0.237  3.6  2.0  15
Togo 1998  7,517  12,829  4,086  0.229  3.2  1.7  14
Egypt 1992  10,760  14,290  6,476  0.266  3.5  1.9  13
Egypt 1995-96  15,567  21,073  10,039  0.250  3.3  1.9  13
Morocco 1992  6,577  9,432  4,348  0.286  4.6  3.2  16
Bangladesh 1993-94  9,174  12,688  4,998  0.285  4.0  2.3  14
Bangladesh 1996-97  8,682  11,533  4,982  0.309  4.0  2.5  13
India 1992-93  87,175  109,326  50,625  0.256  5.4  3.7  21
Nepal 1996  8,082  11,044  4,482  0.219  2.6  0.9  12
Pakistan 1990-91  7,193  14,077  5,367  0.283  4.2  2.7  15
Comoros 1996  2,252  3,788  1,689  0.230  3.5  1.7  15
Kenya 1993  7,950  11,365  3,856  0.264  4.0  2.4  15
Kenya 1998  8,380  10,536  3,865  0.252  4.0  2.5  16
Madagascar  1997  7,171  8,395  3,622  0.230  3.4  1.8  15
Malawi 1992  5,323  6,767  2,511  0.186  2.6  1.1  14
Malawi 1996  2,798  3,269  1,265  0.199  2.6  1.0  13
Mozambique  1997  9,282  11,779  4,447  0.240  3.6  1.3  15
Namibia 1992  4,101  6,136  2,845  0.300  4.5  3.1  15
Rwanda 1992  6,252  8,256  2,997  0.200  2.8  1.3  14
Tanzania 1991-92  8,327  11,804  4,831  0.187  2.8  1.0  15
Tanzania 1996  7,969  10,317  3,735  0.202  3.0  1.1  15
Uganda 1995  7,550  9,533  3,211  0.192  2.9  1.0  15
Zambia 1992  6,209  8,930  4,170  0.259  3.9  2.1  15
Zambia 1996-97  7,286  10,346  4,143  0.275  4.1  2.7  15
Zimbabwe  1994  5,984  8,247  3,252  0.273  4.1  2.2  15
Dominican  Rep. 1991  7,144  7,590  3,808  0.249  4.2  2.7  17
Dominican  Rep. 1996  8,831  8,593  4,152  0.241  3.8  2.4  16
Guatemala 1995  11,297  16,324  6,394  0.264  4.0  2.5  15
Haiti 1994-95  4,818  5,966  2,580  0.266  4.0  2.2  15
Nicaragua  1998  11,528  16,817  7,456  0.238  3.6  2.0  15
Indonesia 1991  26,858  30,090  14,136  0.296  2.7  1.1  9
Indonesia  1994  33,738  36,652  16,607  0.258  3.4  1.6  13
Indonesia 1997  34,255  33,424  16,235  0.216  2.8  1.1  13
Philippines 1993  12,995  16,315  7,159  0.257  3.6  2.2  14
Philippines 1998  12,407  14,567  6,644  0.261  3.9  2.5  15
Bolivia 1993-94  9,114  10,529  4,032  0.311  3.7  2.3  12
Bolivia 1997  12,109  13,182  5,250  0.313  4.4  2.8  14
Brazil 1996  13,283  11,822  6,208  0.226  3.2  1.3  14
Brazil, Northeast 1991  6,064  6,789  3,319  0.263  4.2  2.9  16
Brazil, Northeast 1996  4,663  4,945  2,494
Colombia 1990  7,412  7,153  3,618  0.216  3.2  2.0  15
Colombia 1995  10,112  9,063  4,506  0.240  3.6  2.3  15
Peru 1991-92  13,479  16,912  7,666  0.283  4.2  2.9  15
Peru 1996  28,122  32,808  13,525  0.267  4.0  2.5  15
Kazakhstan 1995  4,178  3,038  1,355  0.203  3.0  1.5  15
Turkey 1993  8,612  8,304  4,567  0.234  2.8  1.5  12
Uzbekistan  1996  3,703  4,242  2,037  0.190  2.7  0.9  14
Unweighted average  10,564  13,257  5,663  0.248  3.6  2.0  14.7
Unweighted std. dev.  12,302  14,748  6,907  0.032  0.6  0.7  1.6
Unweighted  median  7,517  9,860  4,032  0.250  3.7  2.1  15.0gaps in educational attainment in 35 countries, and in Filmer and Pritchett (1999b) which
investigates the determinants  of education  gaps in India, and how these vary across states. This
paper extends these previous analyses by highlighting  how gender interacts with wealth, adult
education and the presence of schools in the community,  and how these relationships differ
across countries and regions.
The fourth column of Table 1 shows how well the first principal component of the asset
variables (which is the asset index) "fits" the underlying  variables, reporting the proportion of
the variation captured. The proportion is remarkably stable, and reasonably high, at between 20
and 30 percent of the variance (ranging from Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda at 19 percent to
Bolivia at 31 percent).  7
The asset index is calculated separately for each country. Within each country
individuals are sorted by the asset index, and cutoffs for the bottom 40 percent, the middle 40
percent, and the top 20 percent of the population are derived. Households are then assigned to
each of these groups on the basis of their value of the asset index. 8 From here on these groups
are referred to as "the poor," "the middle," and "the rich".  Reference to a "poor" child should be
read as "a child from a household in the group in which 40 percent of the population with the
lowest asset indexes live."
there  is more  than  one  factor  underlying  the "co-movement"  of the assets. Interpreting  this second  principal
component  in a consistent  way  across  countries  is not  straightforward,  and  it is ignored  in  the current
analysis.  It is reasonable  to assume  that  the factor  which  explains  the largest  amount  of the "co-movement"
of the different  assets  can  be interpreted  as a household's  economic  status. Since,  by construction,  principal
components  are orthogonal  to one  another,  the "omitted  variables"  problem  of ignoring  the second  principal
component  should  not  be severe. But  this  rationalization  would  not  be true  of omitted  variable  bias  for
additional  control  variables,  such  as urban  residence,  which  may  be correlated  with  either  component.
7  Since  random  measurement  error  will  tend  to "flatten"  the household  wealth/enrollment  relationship  the
fact  that  the fit is similar  across  countries  is comforting  as the cross-country  comparisons  are therefore  not
likely  to be greatly  affected  by differing  degrees  of measurement  error.
8  This  method  of ranking  households  is analogous  to fairly  standard  approaches  used  in the analyses  of the
correlates  of poverty  or the benefit  incidence  of public  spending  which  use  consumption  quantiles.  In this
application,  while  the cut-off  is based  on all individuals,  the analysis  is carried  out only  for those  aged  6 to
14 or 15  to 19 so there  can be more  or less  than  40 percent  of that  cohort  in  the poorest  households.
8A note of caution is warranted here: the principal components procedure normalizes the
mean of the index to zero for each country. Therefore, when comparing the "poor" in Kenya to
the "poor" in Turkey or India it is important  to keep in mind that the measure is relative, and 40
percent of the individuals are defined as living in "poor households" in every country. This
paper does not attempt to generate an absolute poverty measure based on the asset index
approach. 9 As a rough benchmark, Table 2 reports the percentage of the population living below
the national poverty line, the dollar-a-day  and the two-dollar-a-day  poverty lines for the countries
analyzed here as reported in the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (World
Bank, 1999). The percent who live below a dollar a day clearly varies tremendously across
countries, from below two percent in Morocco  to almost 90 percent in Haiti. In an (unweighted)
average across these countries the percentage living below this internationally comparable
poverty line is about 40 percent - the percentage defined as the "poorest group" in the analysis in
this paper. National poverty lines produce a much more stable  proportion of each country defined
as poor: again, the cross-country  (unweighted)  average is again about 40 percent.
What to take from this?  Although  using an asset index approach does not provide an
internationally  comparable cutoff (in the sense thait  a dollar-a-day  day does) it does identify a
group of individuals  in each country  whose size is comparable to other breakdowns that are
frequently made. In particular, using the 40 percent cutoff in this paper corresponds
approximately  to the percentage of people living  below the national poverty line in many
countries (Cameroon, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Kenya, Philippines) or the percentage living
under a dollar-a-day  in Zimbabwe two-dollars-a-day  in Brazil.1 0
9 An attempt  to do this would  require  benchmarking  the index  derived  in each  country  to an international
standard,  or pooling  the data  to derive  weights.  Attempting  this  interesting  work  is left  for a separate
research  endeavor  and the interpretation  of the present  analysis  is limited  to relative  gaps  within  a country.
10 We do not simply  include  the list  of variables  that  make  up the index  to "control"  for  wealth  in the
regression  as advocated  by Montgomery  et al, 1997,  as for  a substantial  part of the paper  we will  interested
in  the effect  of wealth  per-se. More  applications  of this "asset  index"  approach  using  the DHS  can  be found
9Table 2: Poverty rates based on national and international  standards
Nationally based standard  Intemationally based standard
Population below  the  Population  below  Population below
poverty line  Year  $1 a day  $2 a day  Year
Benin  33  1995
Cameroon  40  1984
Chad  64  1995-96
Cote d'lvoire  18  55  1988
Niger  63  1989-93  32  92  1992
Senegal  33  1991  54  80  1991-92
Togo  32  1987-89
Egypt  8  52  1990-91
Morocco*  26  1984-85  <2  20  1990-91
Bangladesh  43  1991-92
Bangladesh  36  1995-96
India  41  1992  47  88  1994
Nepal  42  1995-96  50  87  1995
Pakistan  34  1991  11  57  1991
Kenya  42  1992  50  78  1992
Madagascar  72  93  1993
Malawi  54  1990-91
Rwanda  51  1993  46  89  1983-85
Tanzania  51  1991
Uganda  55  1993  69  92  1989-90
Zambia  86  1993  85  98  1993
Zimbabwe  26  1990-91  41  68  1990-91
Dominican Rep.  21  1992  20  48  1989
Guatemala  53  77  1989
Haiti  65  1987  88  98  1991
Nicaragua  50  1993  44  75  1993
Indonesia  15  1990  8  50  1996
Philippines  41  1994  27  63  1994
Brazil  17  1990  24  44  1995
Colombia  17  1991  7  22  1991
Kazakhstan*  35  1996  1  12  1993
Unweighted  average  41  37  67
Unweighted std. dev.  17  26  26
Unweighted median  41  41  75
Maximum  86  88  98
Minimum  15  <2  12
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (1999)III) The magnitude of gender and wealth differences  in enrollment
Gender  differences  in enrollment
The basic outcomes disaggregated  by gender are reported in Table 3.  These are the
percentage of girls aged 6 to 11 and aged 12 to 14 enrolled, as well as the percentage of females
aged 15 to 19 who have completed grade 5 or higher. In addition, the table reports the "male-
female gap," which is the difference in the level of the outcome between males and females, and
the "male/female  ratio" which is the ratio of the outcomes. For example, in Benin, 34.1 percent
of girls aged 6 to 11 are enrolled. The male-female  gap is equal to 18.0, indicating that the
enrollmentrate of boys 52.1 percent (34.1 + 18.0). The male/female ratio is equal to 1.53 (52.1 /
34.1) indicating that the enrollment of boys is 53 percent higher than that of girls.
It is important to consider both the gap and the ratio as these highlight different aspects
of the potential disparity. For example, the male-female gap in enrollment of 11 to 14 year olds
is 13.2 percentage points in Cameroon with an associated male/female ratio of 1.67. In India, the
absolute gap is larger at 21.4 percentage points, but the associated ratio is lower at 1.40. The
discrepancy exists because overall enrollment is much lower in Cameroon and although  the
absolute gap is smaller (one can't have less that zero years of schooling), the relative gap is
larger. Although the two measures tend to track each other relatively closely, both concepts are
independently relevant.
From Table 3, even in the youngest age group - 6 to 11 - it is clear that girls are at a
large disadvantage relative to boys in the Western and Central African, North African, and South
Asian regions. In several countries the male female gap in enrollment  is over 10 percentage
points (Benin, Central African Republic-C.A.R--Cote  d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, India, Nepal,
in Bonialla-Chacin  and  Hammer  (1999),  Rutstein  (1999),  Stecklov  et al (1999),  Wagstaff  and  Watanbe
10Table 3: Gender  gaps in enrollment of 6-11 and 12-14  year olds, and attainment  of 15-19  year olds (percent)
15-19  year olds who have
6-11 year olds in school  12-14  year olds in school  completed  grade 5
Male-  Male /  Male-  Male /  Male-  Male /
Female  female  Female  female  Female  female
Female  gap  ratio  Female  gap  ratio  Female  gap  ratio
Benin 1996  34.1  18.0  1.53  29.0  26.6  1.92  19.9  17.6  1.88
Burkina Faso 1992-93  23.2  8.3  1.36  19.6  13.2  1.67  19.3  10.8  1.56
Cameroon 1991  61.4  8.5  1.14  70.4  5.0  1.07  59.9  10.3  1.17
C.A.R. 1994-95  49.9  13.9  1.28  46.6  24.3  1.52  27.7  16.6  1.6
Chad 1998  23.7  12.5  1.53  28.0  22.5  1.8  9.5  18.2  2.91
Cote d'lvoire 1994  42.6  12.4  1.29  39.4  18.4  1.47  35.6  19.4  1.55
Ghana 1993  75.2  2.6  1.03  70.9  8.0  1.11  72.0  5.4  1.07
Mali 1995-96  22.6  6.5  1.29  21.5  12.5  1.58  14.8  9.9  1.67
Niger1992  11.3  6.6  1.58  13.5  14.4  2.07  14.2  11.6  1.82
Niger 1997  18.0  8.0  1.44  21.0  7.4  1.35  17.0  15.3  1.9
Senegal 1992-93  27.0  6.5  1.24  28.3  12.8  1.45  31.1  9.6  1.31
Togo 1998  64.9  9.7  1.15  63.3  20.5  1.32  34.9  21.5  1.62
Egypt 1992  77.4  11.3  1.15  67.5  7.6  1.11  70.8  15.0  1.21
Egypt 1995-96  79.2  9.9  1.13  68.4  9.8  1.14  71.8  12.0  1.17
Morocco 1992  50.8  17.4  1.34  37.0  19.1  1.51  39.8  22.3  1.56
Bangladesh 1993-94  73.3  1.4  1.02  60.2  3.2  1.05  44.0  7.6  1.17
Bangladesh 1996-97  76.8  -0.7  0.99  67.5  -2.3  0.97  50.7  6.0  1.12
India 1992-93  61.9  14.3  1.23  53.1  21.4  1.4  51.4  21.5  1.42
Nepal 1996  57.9  18.3  1.32  50.3  25.4  1.51  35.0  28.6  1.82
Pakistan 1990-91  45.5  18.0  1.4  41.5  26.3  1.63  37.4  24.1  1.64
Comoros 1996  43.4  5.3  1.12  59.4  16.5  1.28  40.1  12.2  1.3
Kenya 1993  70.5  1.0  1.01  88.6  2.1  1.02  84.6  -3.2  0.96
Kenya 1998  86.0  -0.3  1  89.0  3.5  1.04  85.1  -1.7  0.98
Madagascar 1997  62.1  -2.5  0.96  50.0  4.1  1.08  26.4  0.3  1.01
Malawi 1992  55.8  -2.5  0.96  64.4  7.4  1.12  37.0  8.6  1.23
Malawi 1996  91.4  -0.8  0.99  87.0  -0.9  0.99  34.6  12.0  1.35
Mozambique  1997  49.5  6.4  1.13  56.1  14.7  1.26  25.2  16.7  1.66
Namibia 1992  84.4  -4.3  0.95  93.0  -1.5  0.98  72.8  -15.5  0.79
Rwanda 1992  51.6  0.6  1.01  49.8  2.3  1.05  56.4  -3.7  0.93
Tanzania 1991-92  34.6  -3.6  0.89  73.4  3.9  1.05  76.7  -4.2  0.95
Tanzania 1996  35.2  -4.1  0.88  77.4  0.0  1  70.8  -2.7  0.96
Uganda 1995  65.3  2.5  1.04  69.6  9.3  1.13  48.9  6.9  1.14
Zambia 1992  69.0  -3.5  0.95  76.8  5.5  1.07  72.1  4.5  1.06
Zambia 1996-97  54.1  -1.4  0.97  73.8  2.0  1.03  69.5  2.0  1.03
Zimbabwe 1994  82.7  0.8  1.01  88.1  2.0  1.02  91.6  1.0  1.01
Dominican Republic 1991  60.3  -5.8  0.9  88.3  -7.1  0.92  79.9  -13.5  0.83
Dominican Republic 1996  94.2  -1.6  0.98  94.2  -0.8  0.99  81.2  -13.0  0.84
Guatemala 1995  59.5  5.1  1.09  58.0  10.8  1.19  51.9  6.5  1.13
Haiti 1994-95  70.2  -0.7  0.99  79.8  2.4  1.03  44.0  0.8  1.02
Nicaragua 1998  80.4  -4.7  0.94  79.4  -4.8  0.94  72.4  -6.5  0.91
Indonesia  1991  79.0  -2.4  0.97  70.6  6.0  1.08  86.0  3.1  1.04
Indonesia  1994  88.4  -1.2  0.99  74.3  4.0  1.05  88.4  -0.3  1
Indonesia  1997  88.5  -1.2  0.99  83.1  0.6  1.01  90.3  -1.2  0.99
Philippines  1993  71.9  -2.3  0.97  91.1  -2.3  0.97  93.7  -5.7  0.94
Philippines  1998  87.1  -3.7  0.96  91.0  -6.0  0.93  95.3  -6.0  0.94
Bolivia 1993-94  90.3  1.0  1.01  78.7  8.8  1.11  82.1  7.1  1.09
Bolivia 1997  94.6  0.4  1  86.5  5.1  1.06  82.4  6.4  1.08
Brazil 1996  94.4  -0.4  1  92.7  -0.4  1  73.3  -10.7  0.85
Brazil, Northeast  1991  43.1  -8.1  0.81  75.6  -10.4  0.86  42.2  -13.8  0.67
Brazil, Northeast  1996  91.9  -0.4  1  90.8  -0.8  0.99  55.7  -14.1  0.75
Colombia 1990  79.9  -0.5  0.99  72.2  5.0  1.07  80.4  -7.8  0.9
Colombia 1995  92.6  -1.9  0.98  84.0  -1.9  0.98  83.1  -4.6  0.94
Peru 1991-92  87.4  0.5  1.01  87.3  2.3  1.03  90.0  1.9  1.02
Peru 1996  89.0  0.0  1  89.6  3.6  1.04  86.8  2.8  1.03
Kazakstan 1995  77.9  -0.2  1  99.0  -0.2  1  99.7  -0.7  0.99
Turkey 1993  72.2  4.3  1.06  48.6  22.4  1.46  90.2  6.1  1.07
Uzbekistan  1996  75.1  -2.7  0.96  98.9  -1.1  0.99  99.0  0.0  1
Unweighted mean  64.6  3.0  1.09  66.8  7.1  1.18  59.6  4.8  1.20
Unweighted std. Dev.  22.6  6.7  0.18  22.8  9.1  0.27  26.2  10.6  0.38
Maximum  94.6  18.3  1.58  99.0  26.6  2.07  99.7  28.6  2.91
Minimum  11.3  -8.1  0.81  13.5  -10.4  0.86  9.5  -15.5  0.67
Median  70.2  0.5  1.01  70.9  5.0  1.07  69.5  5.4  1.07and Pakistan).  In several  of the Western  and Central  African countries  where  the absolute  gap is
less than  10 percentage  points, the ratio is large (that is, between  1.24 and  1.58 in Burkina  Faso,
Mali,  Niger, and Senegal).  There  are exceptions  however,  in Ghana the gap is only 2.5
percentage  points  and the ratio is 1.03, and in Cameroon  and Togo it is close to 9 percentage
points  and the ratio of about  1.15.  Perhaps surprisingly,  in Bangladesh  in the most  recent year
(1996-97) there  is no female disadvantage  (and there  is even a small female  advantage).
Although  the regional  patterns are  strong, there is still within-region  variability.
In most  of the other countries  covered by the DHS data, there is close to no gender gap in
the youngest  age group, and  in many cases there is a female  advantage.  There are exceptions
however,  such as Comoros,  Guatemala,  Mozambique,  and Turkey.
When moving to the slightly older age group, ages  12 to 14, the pattern  remains much the
same.  In most  countries where  there was a gender  disadvantage  among 6 to 11 year  olds, it is
exacerbated  both as an absolute  and relative  measure  (although  this  doesn't  hold for Egypt and
Morocco).  The male-female  gap reaches over twenty  percentage  points  in Benin,  C.A.R., Chad,
India, Nepal,  Pakistan  and Togo.  The male/female  ratio was as high as 2.06  in Niger although  it
has gone down  since 1992.  In Benin the ratio was 1.92 in 1996 with 56 percent  of boys enrolled
but only 29 percent  of girls.  Again,  in the rest of the world, Comoros,  Guatemala,  Mozambique
and Turkey  stand out as having  a large female disadvantage.  In two of the countries  that did not
have a large disadvantage  among 6 to 11 year olds, Bolivia  and Uganda  the male/female  ratio is
1.11 forages  12to  14.
The bulk of this paper will focus on disparities  in enrollment  of 6 to 14 year olds, but
Table  3 also reports  levels, gaps, and ratios for the percentage  of a recent  cohort  -those  aged  15
to 19 -that  have completed  grade 5.  This is a surmmary measure  that captures both the  share of
(1999).
11children who enroll and the proportion who drop-out of school in the first 5 years." 1 The pattern
is again consistent. Ghana is the only Western and Central African country which does not have
a large gender gap, and Bangladesh is the only South Asian one which does not.  Among
countries outside of Western and Central Africa, North Africa, and South Asia, the same set of
countries who performed poorly with respect to gender equality reappear. An exception is
Malawi where there is a relatively large gap. Malawi has two surveys separated by four years
and a comparison of enrollment  rates of 12 to 14 year olds in school between the survey dates
reveals that although there was a gender disadvantage in 1992,  it had vanished by 1996. The gap
in the percentage of 15 to 19 year olds who have completed grade 5 is therefore most likely a
reflection of a gender disadvantage which existed some time ago.
Although  we are focused here in female disadvantages in education, it should not go
unnoticed that in several countries there is a female advantage. Of the 41 countries analyzed
(counting only the most recent survey in  countries  where there are two) 16 have a female
advantage in the enrollment  of 6 to I I year olds, 10 have a female advantage in the enrollment of
12 to 14 year olds, and I  1 have a female advantage  in the completion  of grade 5. The fact that
the countries for which these data are drawn were not randomly selected makes it hard to draw
strong conclusions,  however it is indicative that a large disadvantage of girls in education may
not be a worldwide problem, but is quite localized in certain regions or countries. 12
Comparison with other data sources
At this point it might be useful to digress and compare the findings based on these
(generally) nationally representative  household surveys to those reported in standard cross-
country tables. Table 4 reports the primary net enrollment  rate for girls as derived from the DHS
" In a subsequent  section,  the properties  of the entire  "attainment  profile"  of this  cohort  are investigated.
12 Filmer,  King,  and  Pritchett  (1998)  and  Filmer  and  Pritchett  (1999b)  disaggregate  the data within  India
and  find  substantial  heterogeneity  across  the different  states.
12surveys (averaging  over the various surveys  when is there are more than one) and as reported in
the World Bank's World Development  Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 1999) database which is
based on UNESCO data (averaging over all available data between 1990 and 1999).'3 Overall
the two data sources tell a similar story. The primary  net enrollment  rate for girls averaged
across all the countries is very similar from the two sources: 58.6 percent based on the DHS
surveys  and 58.3 based on the WDI statistics (when restricting  the sample to countries that have
number from both surveys - the average over all DHS surveys is 63.4 percent). The average
male/female  ratio is similar when using the two sources as well (1.14 from DHS and 1.22 from
WDI). Other characteristics of the distribution (standard deviation, maximum,  minimum and
median) are very similar as well.
The overall similarity,  however, masks some large discrepancies at the country level.
The difference  between the enrollment  rate based on the two sources ranges from -22 percentage
points (Turkey where the DHS implies a rate of 71 percent and the WDI 93 percent) to 47
percentage points (Haiti where the DHS implies a rate of 70 percent and the WDI 23 percent).
After Haiti, the next largest discrepancy  is 19 percentage points (Mozambique  where the DHS
implies a rate of 54 percent and the WDI a rate of 35 percent).
In most countries, the two datasets tell a sirnilar story with respect to gender differences
as well. The main difference occurs in the Western and Central African countries where (except
for Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal) the WDI numbers imply a male/female ratio that is substantially
larger than what the DHS show.  For example, in Chad the WDI imply a male/female ratio of
1.80 whereas.the DHS imply a ratio of 1.53. Relying on the WDI one would overstate the male
"advantage" by almost 30 percentage points. Outside of this region, the data for Bangladesh,
13 The primary  net enrollment  rate  is defined  as the percentage  of children  of primary  school  age who  are
indeed  in primary  school. Unlike  the 6 to 11  years  cutofl  used  in Table  3 the definition  of primary  school
age varies  across  countries.  In 8 of the 41 countries  the range  in 6 to 11,  in another  8 it is 7 to 12,  in
another  5 it is 6 to 10,  in another  4 it is 6 to 12,  and  another  4 it is 7 to 13. The  rest are somewhere  around  a
similar  range.
13Table 4: Comparison  of gender gaps in education: DHS, UNESCO, Barro-Lee.
Primary  net enrollment rate  Average years of schooling in population  over 15
Female level (years)  Male/  female ratio  Female level (years)  Male / female ratio
DHS  WDI  (1990-  DHS  WDI (1990-  DHS  DHS
(average of  1999  (average  of  1999  (average  of  (average  of
DHS years)  average)  DHS years)  average)  DHS years)  BL (1990)  DHS years)  BL (1990)
Benin  30.4  39.8  1.6  1.82  1.2  1.0  2.5  2.36
Burkina Faso  27.3  22.3  1.3  1.56  0.8  2.0
C.A.R.  41.9  42.3  1.3  1.52  1.7  1.2  2.2  2.12
Cameroon  61.4  . 1.1  . 2.8  2.5  1.6  1.47
Chad  .23.7  32.8  1.5  1.80  0.7  3.5
Cote d'lvoire  42.6  46.4  1.3  1.34  1.9  . 2.0
Ghana  73.0  . 1.0  . 4.4  2.0  1.5  2.60
Mali  25.4  17.6  1.3  1.60  0.8  0.5  1.9  2.54
Niger  17.3  17.6  1.6  1.74  0.6  0.5  2.1  2.51
Senegal  32.4  47.3  1.3  1.26  1.4  1.7  1.9  1.73
Togo  64.9  66.8  1.2  1.37  2.0  1.7  2.1  2.54
Egypt  78.3  84.7  1.1  1.14  4.9  3.2  1.5  1.71
Morocco  49.1  56.3  1.36  1.35  2.0  . 1.83
Bangladesh  75.1  59.7  1.0  1.14  2.5  1.4  1.7  2.13
India  61.5  . 1.22  . 3.0  2.8  1.91  1.96
Nepal  57.3  . 1.3  . 1.3  0.7  2.7  3.36
Pakistan  39.7  . 1.4  . 1.8  2.8  2.3  1.93
Comoros  41.5  46.6  1.1  1.23  2.2  . 1.6
Kenya  81.2  1.01  . 5.2  2.9  1.3  1.58
Madagascar  60.4  62.7  1.0  0.92  3.2  . 1.2
Malawi  74.4  59.2  1.0  0.99  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.65
Mozambique  54.3  35.2  1.1  1.30  1.6  0.6  2.0  1.88
Namibia  91.1  92.7  1.0  0.93  5.0  . 1.0
Rwanda  61.0  70.3  1.0  1.01  2.8  1.3  1.3  1.78
Tanzania  52.4  49.8  1.0  0.98  3.6  2.1  1.3  1.54
Uganda  66.6  . 1.0  . 3.2  1.4  1.6  1.49
Zambia  72.9  74.9  1.0  1.02  4.7  3.5  1.4  1.71
Zimbabwe  84.3  . 1.0  . 5.9  2.7  1.2  1.54
Dominican  Rep.  72.1  82.7  0.9  0.96  6.8  4.5  1.0  0.99
Guatemala  66.5  . 1.11  . 3.8  2.7  1.22  1.28
Haiti  70.2  22.6  1.0  0.96  2.8  2.0  1.4  2.00
Nicaragua  83.1  78.2  1.0  0.97  5.4  3.7  1.0  1.00
Indonesia  91.1  95.0  1.0  1.05  5.2  4.1  1.3  1.27
Philippines  90.0  . 0.97  . 8.3  6.9  0.99  0.99
Bolivia  91.6  86.7  1.0  1.09  6.1  4.2  1.3  1.33
Brazil  94.7  . 0.99  . 5.8  3.7  0.97  1.04
Colombia  88.1  . 1.0  . 6.4  5.1  1.0  0.83
Peru  88.2  90.3  1.0  1.01  6.9  5.9  1.2  1.11
Kazakstan  90.4  . 1.0  . 9.5  . 1.1
Turkey  70.8  92.8  1.05  1.05  4.2  3.1  1.48  1.45
Uzbekistan  62.8  . 1.0  . 9.7  . 1.1
Unweighted  mean*  58.6  58.3  1.1  1.22  3.7  2.6  1.6  1.73
Unweighted  std. Dev.'  23.0  24.7  0.2  0.28  2.1  1.6  0.5  0.58
Maximum'  91.6  95.0  1.6  1.82  8.3  6.9  2.7  3.36
Minimum*  17.3  17.6  0.9  0.92  0.6  0.5  1.0  0.83
Median*  61.0  59.2  1.1  1.14  3.4  2.6  1.5  1.68
Unweighted  mean  63.4  1.1  3.8  1.6
Unweighted  std. Dev.  21.7  0.2  2.4  0.5
Maximum  94.7  1.6  9.7  3.5
Minimum  17.3  0.9  0.6  1.0
Median  66.5  1.0  3.2  1.5
Countries with data  from both sources only.Mozambique,  and Comoros have a similar discrepancy. Despite these differences, of the 27
countries which have data from both sources, all but three show the same sign for the difference
between the enrollment  of girls and of boys (the exceptions are Bangladesh, Indonesia, and
Zimbabwe where the difference is close to zero in any case).
Another comparison one can make on the basis of these data is that to the stock of
education as reported by Barro and Lee (1993) which has been used in numerous papers to
investigate  the determinants of growth. Table 4 reports the average years of schooling  of the
female population over 15 from the DHS data as well as the average years of schooling of the
population over 15 based on the Barro-Lee (BL) data. Here the DHS imply a stock of schooling
that is slightly higher than that in the alternative data source: the mean of the average years of
schooling among women 15 and older across all the Countries  is 3.7 in the DHS data and 2.6 in
the BL data. A possible explanation for this is that the DHS are from a period spanning 1990 to
1998 whereas the BL data are an estimate for 1990. T  he discrepancy  for some countries is
substantial ranging from a high of 3.2 years in (Zimbabwe  where the DHS imply an average of
5.9 years and the BL where the average is 2.7 years) to -1. 1 (Pakistan  where the DHS imply 1.8
years and BL estimate 2.8).
Focusing on the male/female ratio in the stock of education, the DHS tend to imply a
lower degree of male advantage. The cross-country  average male/female ratio from the DHS is
1.58 whereas that in BL is 1.73. Again, this would  be true if male advantage were declining over
time and the DHS were capturing a later period. In some countries the discrepancy  is especially
large, for example in Ghana BL imply that men have 2.6 times the schooling of women but the
DHS implies they have only 1.46 times as much. Other countries where the difference is large
are Bangladesh, Haiti, Mali, Niger, Nepal, Rwanda and Togo.
In summary,  the aggregate  statistics based on the DHS are similar to those that are
frequently used to describe education outcomes across countries, although there is a larger
14discrepancy  in the measures of the stock of education relative to the enrollment rate. Whether or
not the DHS are "better" is left for a different forum,  but the fact that those from the DHS are
transparently based on household surveys  make these data particularly attractive.
Wealth differences in enrollment
The main advantage  of using household surveys to carry out this analysis, however, is
that various dimensions  of inequality can be explored, and in particular wealth using the asset
index approach. Gaps in educational enrollment  and attainment across different wealth groups
are large in almost all developing countries. Filmer and Pritchett (1999a), using a subset of the
countries analyzed here, show that the difference in the median grade attained by 15 to 19 year
olds from the richest and poorest households  reaches as high as 10 years (India), and is
commonly  between 3 and 5 years in other countries.
Why would we expect to see wealth differences in education? A review of the elasticity
between "income" and several educational  outcomes can be found in Behrman and Knowles,
(1997). As those author's discuss, a simplistic economic  model where education is a pure
investment, households  are perfectly inter-generationally  linked, credit markets are perfect and
investment opportunities in education are equally distributed across households implies that
investments in education  will not be related to a family's present financial wealth. The
assumptions of such models can break down on many fronts. Credit markets may not be perfect
an*d  the poor may have less access to it, there may be a large "consumption" component  to
education and wealthier households  will therefore consume  more of it. In addition, the
opportunity costs of children's time spent in schooling, as well as the expected return to that
schooling,  may differ by household  wealth leading to differential  observed investment.  14
14 For  more  discussion  on  these  reasons  for  wealth  differences  see  Filmer  and Pritchett  (1  999b). In
particular,  that  paper  argues  that  large  cross-state  variation  within  India  in the magnitudes  of wealth  gaps
cast  doubt  that  credit  constraints  are a compelling  reason  for explaining  wealth  gaps.
15Table 5 reports the gender and wealth gaps in lhe enrollment of 6 to 14 year olds. Again,
gaps are expressed both in terms of absolute differences (male-female  gaps, rich-poor gaps) as
well as relative differences (male/female  ratio, rich/poor ratio). The countries identified in Table
3 as having large gender gaps reappear when the outcome measure is derived from the sample of
6 to 14 year olds (as opposed to the 6-11, 12-14, or 15-19  age groups).
A striking result from Table 5 is the magnitude of the wealth gaps in enrollment  in many
countries, both in absolute  terms, as well as relative to gender gaps. Except for Ghana, the rich-
poor gaps range from 28 percentage  points (Togo)  to almost 52 percentage points (Senegal)  in
the Western and Central African  countries. The same order of magnitude is seen in the North
Africa, as well as in South Asia.  Even Bangladesh which has a slight female advantage  in
enrollments,  has a rich-poor gap of 17 percentage  points (and a rich/poor ratio of  1.25). The
wealth gaps appear as well in many of the countries in the other regions as well. For instance in
Eastern and Southern Africa, Madagascar,  Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia all have small (or
negative) female disadvantages  but all have wealth gaps of over 19 percentage points.
Figure 1 presents the same data in a different  format: the left panel shows the scatter plot
of the rich-poor gap against the male-female gap, the right panel shows the equivalent scatter plot
for the ratios.' 5 Most countries have a substantial rich-poor gap and a large wealth gap does not
imply a large gender gap. However, countries with large gender gaps also tend to have large
wealth gaps.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Figure 1 is the magnitude of the wealth gaps relative
to the magnitude of the gender gaps: wealth gaps are in general much larger. The male-female
gap ranges from -5 percentage points (Nicaragua)  to 2  1 percentage points (Benin and Nepal).
The male/female ratio ranges from 0.94 (Nicaragua  andl  Tanzania) to 1.73 (Niger 1992). The
rich-poor gap ranges from -2 percentage points (Kazakhstan  which is the only country with a
16Table 5: Gender  and wealth gaps in enrollment of 6-14 year olds
6-14 year olds in school  6-14 year olds in school
Female  Male-  Male /  Poor  Rich-Poor  Rich / Poor
Female  gap Female ratio  gap  ratio
Benin 1996  32.6  20.5  1.63  24.3  47.2  2.94
Burkina Faso 1992-93  22.1  9.8  1.44  14.3  48.5  4.39
Cameroon 1991  64.0  7.4  1.12  49.3  42.8  1.87
C.A.R. 1994-95  48.9  16.9  1.35  40.0  40.7  2.02
Chad 1998  24.9  15.5  1.62  22.0  35.2  2.60
Cote d'lvoire 1994  41.7  14.1  1.34  31.9  41.5  2.30
Ghana 1993  73.9  4.2  1.06  69.3  21.5  1.31
Mali 1995-96  22.3  8.2  1.37  11.1  50.7  5.57
Niger 1992  11.9  8.7  1.73  9.5  30.2  4.19
Niger 1997  18.9  7.8  1.41  11.6  43.4  4.75
Senegal 1992-93  27.4  8.4  1.31  14.1  51.5  4.66
Togo 1998  64.4  13.1  1.20  59.6  27.5  1.46
Egypt 1992  74.3  10.1  1.14  66.2  26.3  1.40
Egypt 1995-96  75.7  9.9  1.13  67.6  27.9  1.41
Morocco 1992  45.8  18.1  1.39  26.7  62.8  3.35
Bangladesh 1993-94  69.1  2.0  1.03  62.1  18.7  1.30
Bangladesh 1996-97  73.8  -1.2  0.98  66.8  16.6  1.25
India 1992-93  59.1  16.5  1.28  50.0  44.2  1.88
Nepal 1996  55.5  20.5  1.37  61.6  24.3  1.40
Pakistan 1990-91  44.3  20.4  1.46  36.6  49.0  2.34
Comoros 1996  48.3  8.9  1.18  39.2  34.1  1.87
Kenya 1993  76.5  0.9  1.01  75.1  8.7  1.12
Kenya 1998  87.0  0.9  1.01  86.9  5.2  1.06
Madagascar 1997  58.6  -0.6  0.99  46.8  43.2  1.92
Malawi 1992  58.6  0.8  1.01  46.9  34.8  1.74
Malawi 1996  89.7  -0.8  0.99  87.0  6.3  1.07
Mozambique  1997  51.7  9.3  1.18  43.9  33.8  1.77
Namibia 1992  87.1  -3.5  0.96  84.0  7.8  1.09
Rwanda 1992  51.0  1.1  1.02  45.9  19.1  1.42
Tanzania 1991-92  47.2  -0.9  0.98  41.7  18.4  1.44
Tanzania 1996  48.6  -2.7  0.94  39.8  23.6  1.59
Uganda 1995  66.6  4.7  1.07  59.0  23.7  1.40
Zambia 1992  71.5  -0.8  0.99  54.3  37.6  1.69
Zambia 1996-97  60.4  -0.3  0.99  48.8  36.0  1.74
Zimbabwe 1994  84.4  1.2  1.01  81.1  11.7  1.14
Dominican Republic 1991  69.5  -6.0  0.91  50.3  39.3  1.78
Dominican Republic 1996  94.2  -1.3  0.99  88.7  9.1  1.10
Guatemala 1995  59.0  7.0  1.12  46.4  44.4  1.96
Haiti 1994-95  73.4  0.3  1.00  55.2  34.5  1.62
Nicaragua 1998  80.0  -4.8  0.94  63.9  29.1  1.45
Indonesia 1991  76.4  0.2  1.00  66.6  23.1  1.35
Indonesia 1994  83.6  0.6  1.01  75.5  19.6  1.26
Indonesia 1997  86.6  -0.6  0.99  80.5  14.5  1.18
Philippines 1993  78.6  -2.7  0.97  70.0  16.3  1.23
Philippines 1998  88.4  -4.4  0.95  78.9  15.9  1.20
Bolivia 1993-94  86.4  3.7  1.04  81.0  14.9  1.18
Bolivia 1997  92.0  1.9  1.02  87.8  10.0  1.11
Brazil 1996  93.8  -0.4  1.00  89.0  9.2  1.10
Brazil, Northeast  1991  53.9  -9.0  0.83  32.8  37.4  2.14
Brazil, Northeast  1996  91.5  -0.5  0.99  88.6  9.6  1.11
Colombia 1990  77.4  1.2  1.02  68.3  21.2  1.31
Colombia 1995  89.7  -1.8  0.98  80.9  16.7  1.21
Peru 1991-92  87.4  1.1  1.01  83.9  6.5  1.08
Peru 1996  89.2  1.2  1.01  85.8  8.8  1.10
Kazakstan 1995  85.3  -0.7  0.99  85.8  -2.0  0.98
Turkey 1993  63.7  10.9  1.17  61.0  19.1  1.31
Uzbekistan  1996  82.9  -2.9  0.97  80.2  0.9  1.01
Unweighted mean  65.3  4.2  1.12  57.5  26.2  1.81
Unweighted  std. dev.  21.8  7.3  0.20  23.4  15.1  1.04
Maximum  94.2  20.5  1.73  89.0  62.8  5.57
Minimum  11.9  -9.0  0.83  9.5  -2.0  0.98negative wealth  gap, albeit tiny) to 63 percentage  points  (Morocco).  The rich/poor  ratio ranges
from  0.98 (Kazakhstan)  to 5.57 (Mali).
Figure 1: Gender and wealth differences in the enrollment of 6 to 14 year olds.
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There  are two notes of caution  about how one might interpret  the results  so far.  First, the
analysis does not imply that investments  in girls education  are not desirable  where gender  gaps
are small.  There  is a large literature  on the benefits  oi female  education  on a host of private and
social outcomes  (e.g. King and Hill, 1993, Schultz,  1993, Benefo  and Schultz  1995, Pitt,  1995,
Haddad  et al, 1997).  In that context  it is the level of fernale education,  not the gaps, that matter
for policy.  This does however  leave open the issue of whether,  when,  and where  additional
public investments  in girls education  should take priority over boys education  when the two are
roughly at the same level.
Second, the message  to take from the previous  section  is not that gender gaps  are
unimportant  because wealth gaps  are more widespread  or larger, rather  it should be that gender
gaps are more important  in some regions  and countries  than others,  and that wealth  gaps should
be an important part of any analysis  of inequalities  in educational  outcomes.  The next  section
15  In this and subsequent figures, in countries where there have been two surveys only the most recent is
shown in the figures although data for both are reported in the tables.
17analyzes how the interaction of gender and wealth result in large social gaps in educational
outcomes.
IV) The interaction of wealth and gender: gender differences in enrollment  by wealth, and wealth
differences  by gender
Gender diJferences  in enrollment by wealth  group
In order to investigate  the interaction of wealth and gender and educational outcomes,
the first four columns of Table 6 report the enrollment  of 6 to 14  year olds disaggregated  by
wealth as well as by gender. The subsequent  columns report the gender gap (ratio) by wealth
group, and the wealth gap (ratio) by gender.' 6 In order to ease the interpretation of this table, the
left panels of Figure 2 plot the gap (ratio) among the poor against the gap (ratio) among the rich.
Countries  with points above the diagonal line are those where the gender gap (ratio) is larger
among the poor than among the rich.
The points in the top left hand panel of Figure 2 separate (perhaps not perfectly) into
four main groups. The first is a group of countries where the female disadvantage is small,  or
negative, both for the rich and for the poor (that is less than about 9 percentage points). The
second group is the group for which the female disadvantage is large for both the rich and for the
poor. This group separates into the primarily Western African countries where it is slightly
larger for the rich than for the poor (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and
Senegal) and countries for which it is slightly smaller (Chad, Comoros, Togo, and Turkey). Next
there is a group with low female disadvantage among the rich, but a reasonably large (greater
than about 9 but less than about 15  percentage points) disadvantage among the poor
16  These  two  are  related  by construction.  For example,  the difference  in differences  will  be equal: (Emr  -
Emp)  - (Efr-Efp)  = (Emr-Efr)  - (Emp-Efp)  where  Emr  is the enrollmtent  of rich  males,  Efp  the enrollment
of poor  females,  and so on.
18Table 6: Gender  gaps by  wealth, and wealth gaps by gender, for enrollment olF  6-14 year olds
Male  Male  Female  Female  Male-Female  Rich-Poor  gap  Male / Female  Rich  I Poor ratio
gap)  ratio
Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Male  Female  Rich  Poor  Male  Female
Benin 1996  84.7  33.2  60.3  14.2  24.4  19.0  51.5  46.0  1.41  2.33  2.55  4.23
Burkina Faso 1992-93  70.2  18.7  56.2  9.9  14.0  8.8  51.5  46.2  1.25  1.88  3.76  5.65
Cameroon 1991  93.6  55.9  90.6  42.5  2.9  13.4  37.6  48.1  1.03  1.32  1.67  2.13
C.A.R. 1994-95  83.3  50.8  78.0  28.7  5.3  22.1  32.6  49.3  1.07  1.77  1.64  2.72
Chad 1998  64.2  30.4  50.2  14.2  14.0  16.2  33.9  36.0  1.28  2.14  2.12  3.54
Cote d'lvoire 1994  84.6  38.6  64.2  24.9  20.4  13.6  46.0  39.2  1.32  1.55  2.19  2.57
Ghana 1993  93.6  70.3  88.1  68.2  5.5  2.1  23.3  19.9  1.06  1.03  1.33  1.29
Mali 1995-96  68.1  14.4  56.1  7.9  12.0  6.5  53.7  48.1  1.21  1.82  4.73  7.09
Niger 1992  44.2  14.1  34.9  4.9  9.3  9.3  30.0  30.1  1.27  2.91  3.12  7.18
Niger 1997  58.7  14.9  51.2  8.1  7.5  6.9  43.8  43.2  1.15  1.85  3.93  6.35
Senegal 1992-93  71.0  17.8  60.3  10.0  10.8  7.8  53.2  50.2  1.18  1.78  3.99  6.02
Togo 1998  94.7  67.6  80.3  50.0  14.4  17.6  27.1  30.3  1.18  1.35  1.40  1.61
Egypt 1992  93.2  76.3  91.7  55.6  1.5  20.8  16.9  36.2  1.02  1.37  1.22  1.65
Egypt 1995-96  95.2  77.9  95.7  56.5  -0.4  21.4  17.3  39.2  1.00  1.38  1.22  1.69
Morocco 1992  94.4  38.5  84.5  14.4  9.9  24.1  55.8  70.1  1.12  2.67  2.45  5.87
Bangladesh 1993-94  82.0  63.0  79.7  61.2  2.2  1.9  19.0  18.6  1.03  1.03  1.30  1.30
Bangladesh 1996-97  86.0  65.6  80.9  68.0  5.1  -2.4  20.4  12.9  1.06  0.96  1.31  1.19
India 1992-93  95.4  61.4  92.9  37.5  2.5  23.9  34.0  55.3  1.03  1.64  1.55  2.47
Nepal 1996  90.1  73.3  81.5  49.8  8.6  23.4  16.8  31.7  1.11  1.47  1.23  1.64
Pakistan 1990-91  85.8  50.0  85.4  21.3  0.5  28.7  35.8  64.1  1.01  2.35  1.72  4.01
Comoros 1996  78.8  45.5  68.4  32.7  10.4  12.7  33.3  35.6  1.15  1.39  1.73  2.09
Kenya 1993  84.5  74.7  83.2  75.5  1.4  -0.8  9.9  7.7  1.02  0.99  1.13  1.10
Kenya 1998  94.0  86.2  90.2  87.6  3.8  -1.4  7.8  2.6  1.04  0.98  1.09  1.03
Madagascar 1997  90.5  46.5  89.5  47.1  0.9  -0.7  44.0  42.4  1.01  0.99  1.95  1.90
Malawi 1992  82.5  48.0  81.0  45.9  1.5  2.0  34.5  35.0  1.02  1.04  1.72  1.76
Malawi 1996  93.0  88.7  93.6  85.4  -0.7  3.3  4.2  8.2  0.99  1.04  1.05  1.10
Mozambique 1997  77.6  51.2  77.8  36.4  -0.2  14.8  26.4  41.3  1.00  1.40  1.52  2.13
Namibia 1992  93.0  81.9  90.8  86.0  2.2  -4.0  11.1  4.9  1.02  0.95  1.14  1.06
Rwanda 1992  65.0  46.5  65.0  45.3  -0.1  1.2  18.4  19.8  1.00  1.03  1.40  1.44
Tanzania 1991-92  60.1  41.4  60.0  42.0  0.0  -0.6  18.7  18.0  1.00  0.99  1.45  1.43
Tanzania 1996  62.8  40.0  64.0  39.6  -1.2  0.4  22.8  24.4  0.98  1.01  1.57  1.62
Uganda 1995  83.5  64.1  81.9  53.8  1.6  10.3  19.5  28.1  1.02  1.19  1.30  1.52
Zambia 1992  92.8  54.5  91.2  54.2  1.6  0.4  38.3  37.0  1.02  1.01  1.70  1.68
Zambia 1996-97  85.3  49.7  84.4  48.0  0.9  1.7  35.6  36.4  1.01  1.04  1.72  1.76
Zimbabwe 1994  92.6  82.2  92.9  80.0  -0.3  2.2  10.4  12.9  1.00  1.03  1.13  1.16
Dominican Republic 1991  86.9  49.1  91.8  51.7  -5.0  -2.7  37.8  40.1  0.95  0.95  1.77  1.77
Dominican Republic 1996  98.3  87.7  97.3  89.9  1.0  -2.2  10.6  7.4  1.01  0.98  1.12  1.08
Guatemala 1995  91.2  51.3  90.5  41.7  0.7  9.5  39.9  48.8  1.01  1.23  1.78  2.17
Haiti 1994-95  93.6  55.5  86.8  54.9  6.8  0.6  38.1  31.9  1.08  1.01  1.69  1.58
Nicaragua  1998  90.8  61.4  94.9  66.4  -4.1  -5.0  29.4  28.5  0.96  0.92  1.48  1.43
Indonesia 1991  90.5  66.6  88.8  66.5  1.7  0.1  23.8  22.3  1.02  1.00  1.36  1.33
Indonesia 1994  96.2  75.6  94.0  75.5  2.2  0.0  20.6  18.5  1.02  1.00  1.27  1.24
Indonesia 1997  95.1  79.4  94.9  81.5  0.3  -2.1  15.7  13.3  1.00  0.97  1.20  1.16
Philippines  1993  86.6  68.4  86.0  71.8  0.6  -3.4  18.2  14.3  1.01  0.95  1.27  1.20
Philippines  1998  95.0  75.5  94.6  82.5  0.3  -7.1  19.5  12.1  1.00  0.91  1.26  1.15
Bolivia 1993-94  96.6  84.8  95.3  77.0  1.3  7.8  11.8  18.3  1.01  1.10  1.14  1.24
Bolivia 1997  99.1  89.7  96.5  85.8  2.6  3.9  9.4  10.7  1.03  1.05  1.10  1.12
Brazil 1996  98.2  88.6  98.3  89.5  -0.1  0.9  9.6  8.8  1.00  0.99  1.11  1.10
Brazil, Northeast  1991  69.6  27.5  70.7  38.5  -1.1  -11.0  42.1  32.2  0.98  0.71  2.53  1.84
Brazil, Northeast  1996  99.4  87.7  96.4  89.4  2.9  -1.7  11.6  7.0  1.03  0.98  1.13  1.08
Colombia 1990  89.8  69.0  89.3  67.7  0.5  1.2  20.9  21.5  1.01  1.02  1.30  1.32
Colombia 1995  98.7  79.1  96.5  82.7  2.2  -3.6  19.5  13.8  1.02  0.96  1.25  1.17
Peru 1991-92  90.3  85.0  90.4  82.7  -0.1  2.3  5.3  7.7  1.00  1.03  1.06  1.09
Peru 1996  94.7  87.0  94.4  84.5  0.3  2.5  7.8  9.9  1.00  1.03  1.09  1.12
Kazakstan 1995  84.0  85.5  83.6  86.0  0.4  -0.5  -1.5  -2.4  1.00  0.99  0.98  0.97
Turkey 1993  83.7  68.0  76.6  53.6  7.0  14.4  15.7  23.0  1.09  1.27  1.23  1.43
Uzbekistan  1996  78.4  79.6  83.8  80.8  -5.5  -1.3  -1.2  3.0  0.93  0.98  0.98  1.04
Unweighted  mean  85.5  60.3  81.9  54.5  3.6  5.7  25.3  27.4  1.06  1.28  1.67  2.13
Unweighted  std. Dev.  12.0  21.9  14.5  25.8  5.8  9.3  14.7  16.8  0.10  0.47  0.81  1.62
Maximum  99.4  89.7  98.3  89.9  24.4  28.7  55.8  70.1  1.41  2.91  4.73  7.18
Minimum  44.2  14.1  34.9  4.9  -5.5  -11.0  -1.5  -2.4  0.93  0.71  0.98  0.97
Median  90.1  64.1  86.0  54.2  1.6  2.1  20.9  28.1  1.02  1.03  1.36  1.52(Mozambique,  Guatemala,  Uganda, and Cameroon).  Last there is a group  made up primarily  of
the North African  and South Asian  countries where the gender  disadvantage  is small among the
rich but quite large among the poor  (Egypt, Pakistan,  India, Central  African  Republic, Nepal,
Morocco)."7
Figure  2: The interaction  of gender  and wealth  differences  in  the enrollment  of 6 to 14
year  olds.
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1  7Bonilla-Chacin  and Hanumer  (1999) find that within Egypt, India, and Pakistan, the difference  in gender
gaps in child mortality  disappear as wealth increases.
19The somewhat  different message conveyed by the lower left panel shows the relevance of using
the differences versus the ratios approach to analyzing,  the gender disadvantage. By contrast to
the absolute differences, the relationship  between the imale/female  ratios among the rich and poor
separates into three main groups. First, the group  where the ratio is very close to one (less than
1.1) for both groups. Second, a group where the ratio is either small or moderate among  the rich
and moderate (between 1.1 and 1.5) among the poor (Bolivia, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt,
Guatemala, Mozambique,  Nepal, Togo, Turkey, Uganda). Last is the group with a small or
moderate ratio among the rich, but a large ratio for the poor (Benin, Burkina Faso, Central
African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Mali, Morocco,  Niger, Pakistan, Senegal).
Wealth differences in enrollment by gender
In contrast to the gender gaps by wealth, the right panels of Figure 2 show much more
consistency  between wealth gaps among males and femnales:  in most countries the gap and the
ratio are close to being equal for boys and girls. There is a group of countries however where the
wealth gap is substantially larger among females than among males. The countries with the
largest discrepancies (starting with the highest) are Pakistan (35 percentage points for boys and
64 percentage  points for girls), Egypt (17 for boys and 39 for girls), and India (34 for boys and
55 for girls). Cameroon, Central African Republic,  Mozambique, Morocco and Nepal are all
close behind. In this case, the same set of countries is identified as having large discrepancies
when using the ratios as the measure of disparity.
International correlates of the gender gap
In the descriptive exercise so far region appears to be a strong correlate of gender
disparities. Figure 3 explores the relationship to four country level correlates in a series of
bivariate scatterplots between the magnitude of the male-female gap and (the log of) GNP per
20capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP - which adjusts for differences in the cost of living
across countries), income inequality as measured by the Gini index, income growth as measured
by the GNP per capita growth rate, and public spending on primary education per student. All
these variables are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1999)
and are averaged over the period since 1990 (Annex Figure 3a shows the same figures for the
male/female ratio).'8
The story that emerges  from these graphs is not one of a systematic relationship between
the variables and the magnitude of the gender gap. The only correlate with a significant
relationship at the ten percent level is a country's income inequality as measured by the Gini
index (correlation coefficient equal to -.38, pvalue=.07,  N=23).  Other than the Gini index,
income level is negatively but insignificantly  related to the male female gap, and GNP per capita
growth and public spending  per student on primary education have close to zero and insignificant
correlations. Of course this exploration is limited  by its very narrow bivariate approach. As an
indication though, the results do suggest that the few variables analyzed do not give a strong lead
on this and more work needs to be done to explore the international correlates and determinants
of gender gaps in education (for more discussion and a further exploration of this see Dollar and
Gatti, 1999,  Filmer, King, and Pritchett 1998).
18 The  annex  is available  from  the author  at dfilmer(a.worldbank.org  or directly  from
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/edattainl/edattain.htm
21Figure 3: Country level correlates of gender differences in the enrollment of 6 to 14 year
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22V) Gender and wealth differences in attainment profiles
The  attainment profile
The results presented so far have focused on gender and wealth differences in the
enrollment of 6 to 14 year olds. The analysis of this young cohort yields informative, and
relatively up-to-date results on the extent of gender and wealth gaps. However, it limits what one
can say about where in the education system  gaps occur. A different approach, one which looks
at the highest grade completed  by an older cohort consisting  of people who have largely
completed their schooling (or at least the schooling  under analysis), yields insights on this
(Mingat and Tan, 1999, Filmer and Pritchett, 1999a).
The attainment profiles, pictured in Figure 4, show graphically  the proportion of
individuals  of the particular cohort that have completed each grade or higher. For example, this
means that the level of the curve at grade 1 shows the proportion that ever attended school and
completed first grade. One minus this proportion is the proportion that never completed even
one year of schooling.  19 The difference between the proportion that completed grade 1 or higher
and those that completed grade 5 or higher is an estimate of the proportion of all children that
dropped out between grades 1 and 5.
Figure 4 shows the attainment profiles for each of the countries with the profile of males
and females from the poor, middle, and rich households  identified. As an example of how to
interpret these figures, take the case of Morocco. In Morocco, 98 percent of males aged 15 to 19
from rich households have completed  grade 1 or higher, 89 percent have completed grade 5 or
higher, and 43 percent have completed grade 9 or higher. This can be compared to females from
rich households  whose completion  rates for grades 1, 5, and 9 are 85 percent, 78 percent, and 41
percent respectively. Again, this can be compared to males from poor households where the
19 With  this  data  one  cannot  distinguish  between  having  attended  school  but  never  completing  even  one
grade  and  never  having  attended  school  at all.
23completion  rates are 55 percent,  35 percent,  and 5 percent,  and females  from poor households  at
21 percent,  10 percent,  and  1 percent.
Figure  4: Educational  attainment  profiles for ages 1!5-19  by gender and wealth
(Vertical axis is proportion  of children  who have completed grade).
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24Figure  4 continued: Educational  attainment  profiles  for ages 15-19  by gender  and  wealth
(Vertical  axis is proportion of children who have  completed  grade).
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25Figure  4 continued: Educational  attainment  profiles for ages 15-19  by gender  and  wealth
(Vertical  axis is proportion of children  who have completed  grade).
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26Patterns of gender and wealth differentials in attainment
There are regions where there is a large female disadvantage in the entire attainment
profile: these are largely those in Western and Central Africa, North Africa, and South Asia, as
well as a few countries in the rest of the world where the profiles for females lie substantially
below those for males (Mozambique,  Turkey). In addition, there is a substantial number of
countries where the profile for males is below that for females, that is there is a female advantage
(Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic and the Philippines).
Similarly to the enrollment  analysis, it is important to consider the interaction between
gender and wealth. Here there are two main results that stand out.  First, the countries with large
female disadvantages  fall into two types: those with a "generalized" female disadvantage, and
those with a female disadvantage only for the poor (or poor and middle) group. The Western and
Central African countries, even those where attainment is fairly high for the rich, tend to have a
generalized  disadvantage. On the other had, the countries in North Africa and South Asia tend to
have eliminated the female disadvantage among the rich, but it is large among the poor (except in
Bangladesh). Second, in the countries where there appears to be a female advantage, this
advantage  appears to exist only among those from poor households.
Focusing now on the gender gap in poor households, Table 7 reports the male-female  gap
and the male/female ratio in the percentage of 15 to 19 year olds that have completed grades 1, 5,
and 9. The results on the male-female  gap conform well to the visual impression created by the
attainment profiles: in countries with a large female disadvantage in grade I completion, the
male-female  gap remains similar, or diminishes, successively  between the different grades. For
example, in Benin it is 28 percentage points in grade 1, 9.9 percentage  points in grade 5, and 0.8
percentage points in grade 9. In Egypt the gaps are 26, 24, and 16 percentage points for grades 1,
5, and 9 respectively whereas in Pakistan they are 39, 31, and 9.4 percentage points respectively.
27Table 7: Gender differences among  the poor in the percentage  of 15 to 19 year olds who have completed grades 1, 5, and 9
Male-Female  gap among  the poor  Male/Female ratio among  the poor
Grade 1  Grade 5  Grade 9  Grade 1  Grade 5  Grade 9
Benin 1996  27.8  9.9  0.8  3.51  4.98  4.17
Burkina Faso 1992-93  9.7  8.7  0.4  2.23  3.72
Cameroon 1991  18.1  18.5  3.2  1.33  1.53  1.82
C.A.R. 1994-95  31.7  16.5  0.7  1.88  3.43
Chad 1998  30.7  9.9  0.2  2.80  8.42
Cote d'lvoire 1994  16.5  16.3  5.5  1.50  1.88  6.14
Ghana 1993  9.4  4.3  -1.2  1.13  1.06  0.96
Mali 1995-96  9.3  3.7  0.3  2.23  2.28
Niger 1992  12.7  10.6  1.5  2.36  2.67
Niger 1997  17.8  14.3  0.5  3.49  4.18  5.57
Senegal 1992-93  10.9  10.2  1.8  1.77  2.16  3.43
Togo 1998  28.8  23.7  2.5  1.57  2.53  5.51
Egypt  1992  29.4  30.0  16.3  1.53  1.63  1.57
Egypt 1995-96  25.6  23.9  15.7  1.42  1.47  1.50
Morocco 1992  34.1  25.4  3.8  2.62  3.66  4.43
Bangladesh 1993-94  14.4  8.6  3.7  1.33  1.37  1.81
Bangladesh 1996-97  14.9  10.4  4.0  1.29  1.33  1.64
India 1992-93  35.7  31.7  15.4  2.22  2.46  3.51
Nepal 1996  38.8  30.9  9.1  1.95  2.20  2.24
Pakistan 1990-91  38.6  31.3  9.4  4.15  4.77  7.32
Comoros 1996  26.0  13.8  0.3  1.56  1.63  1.23
Kenya 1993  0.4  -1.5  2.0  1.00  0.98  1.22
Kenya 1998  1.2  0.2  -0.3  1.01  1.00  0.97
Madagascar 1997  2.8  -0.3  0.0  1.05  0.96  0.99
Malawi 1992  14.4  8.7  0.9  1.24  1.35  2.24
Malawi 1996  27.0  12.4  -0.9  1.49  1.90  0.00
Mozambique  1997  36.4  10.6  0.0  1.90  2.57  3.49
Namibia 1992  -6.5  -20.6  -2.1  0.93  0.67  0.63
Rwanda 1992  -0.8  -7.9  2.4  0.99  0.84  1.96
Tanzania 1991-92  2.9  -2.0  -0.3  1.04  0.97  0.43
Tanzania 1996  9.8  -1.5  0.2  1.13  0.98  1.68
Uganda 1995  16.4  8.2  -0.6  1.23  1.23  0.79
Zambia 1992  8.4  6.3  0.4  1.11  1.13  1.84
Zambia 1996-97  3.0  -0.8  -0.4  1.04  0.99  0.89
Zimbabwe 1994  -1.3  0.9  -0.2  0.99  1.01  0.99
Dominican  Republic 1991  -5.1  -20.9  -6.8  0.95  0.69  0.54
Dominican  Republic 1996  -7.2  -15.0  -6.5  0.92  0.77  0.63
Guatemala 1995  10.4  12.3  3.2  1.17  1.71  6.90
Haiti 1994-95  7.3  -1.3  1.0  1.11  0.93  1.80
Nicaragua 1998  -6.3  -9.4  -3.1  0.92  0.80  0.57
Indonesia  1991  4.8  7.1  4.7  1.05  1.10  1.29
Indonesia  1994  1.0  1.3  1.8  1.01  1.02  1.10
Indonesia 1997  0.5  -2.1  -0.7  1.01  0.97  0.97
Philippines 1993  0.5  -11.0  -16.2  1.01  0.87  0.61
Philippines 1998  -1.2  -12.4  -18.3  0.99  0.86  0.53
Bolivia 1993-94  4.2  12.8  12.1  1.04  1.20  1.91
Bolivia 1997  2.8  13.4  10.6  1.03  1.22  1.69
Brazil 1996  -5.4  -11.7  -4.3  0.94  0.78  0.57
Brazil, Northeast 1991  -10.6  -11.2  -1.1  0.87  0.39  0.27
Brazil, Northeast 1996  -10.2  -12.9  -3.5  0.89  0.69  0.46
Colombia 1990  -4.3  -10.9  -5.9  0.96  0.83  0.54
Colombia 1995  -4.9  -8.9  -5.5  0.95  0.87  0.69
Peru 1991-92  1.6  4.7  5.0  1.02  1.06  1.26
Peru 1996  2.3  8.3  2.5  1.02  1.12  1.15
Kazakstan 1995  -0.3  -0.1  -4.7  1.00  1.00  0.94
Turkey 1993  8.1  9.4  19.7  1.09  1.11  3.14
Uzbekistan  1996  0.8  0.4  -2.7  1.01  1.00  0.97
Unweighted  mean  10.2  5.4  1.3  1.44  1.70  1.91
Unweighted  std. Dev.  13.7  12.9  6.6  0.72  1.38  1.76
Maximum  38.8  31.7  19.7  4.15  8.42  7.32
Minimum  -10.6  -20.9  -18.3  0.87  0.39  0.00
Median  8.1  7.1  0.4  1.11  1.12  1.25In the three examples mentioned above the results on the male/female ratio tell a
different story: in Benin the ratio changes from 3.5 to 5.0 to 3.7 - that is, in relative terms, the
disadvantage  grows from grade 1 to 5, but then diminishes  from grade 5 to 9.  In Egypt the
relative disadvantage changes from 1.4 to 1.5  to 1.5, that is it remains quite stable. By contrast,
in Pakistan, the ratio goes from 4.2 in grade 1, to 4.8 in grade 5, and then to a very large 7.3 in
grade 9.
Figure 5 summarizes  the change in these gaps and ratios from grade 1 to 5, and grade 5
to 9.  The top two panels show the change in the male-female  gap.  Most of the points are below
the 45 degree line showing that indeed where there was a female disadvantage, the gap generally
diminishes  as one gets further along in the school system. By contrast, the bottom two panels
show the change in the male/female ratio from grade 1 to 5, and 5 to 9. Here most of the points
lie above the 45 degree line showing that the relative female disadvantage tends to increase as
one advances through the school system. In some cases the increase is truly astounding from
grade 5 to grade 9: from 1.9 to 5.9 in Cote d'Ivoire, from 4.8 to 7.8 in Pakistan, and from 1.7 to
7.4 in Guatemala. In all these extreme cases, however, the completion  of grade 9 is very close to
zero for females (6.5 for males versus 1.1 in Cote d'Ivoire, 10.9 versus 1.5 in Pakistan, and 3.7
versus 0.5 in Guatemala, see Annex Table A). It should also be noted that in several cases the
ratio is "infinite" because the percentage of 15 to 19 year old females from poor households  who
have completed grade 9 is estimated to be zero (Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Niger,
Chad, Mali and Senegal)
28Figure 5: Gender differences in the attainment  of 15  to 19 year olds from poor
households.
/e-FaTe  gap  in orp.  grade  1  and  5 armong  the  poor  Ie-Fenrale  gap  in rnp.  grade  5and9 anong  thepoor
40 - 40  0
-n  30- - :30-
alsi  tgD  g  0 
20-  CD  20-  tt  /
E  'vJ  E
0  -0  3betdM  10  - - 10  2
Eio  6  m  a-  tg8CC
cm  0  CC  0  z
Cu  Cu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M  C
Cu  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CD
E  10-  bra 
O  ~mv
Ciu  -20 - 2  co  -20  -
-. 30 -p:pGaj  5o  -30-  -
Mele-Feamale  galo:  Gornp.  Grade  1  lle-Femal e gabo:  CorTp.  Grade  5
le-F  Ie rato  in corTp.  grade land 5angthe  poor  ie-Femle  rao in onp.  grade5and9amongthe  poor
9  - 9-
ted






u~  2  -Cu-  2 
Cu  Cu
cu  co  1
0  0  -
0  1'  2'  3'  4  5  7'  8  90  2'  3  4  5  6  7'  8  9
We-Fealae  ratio:  Cornp.  Grade  1  IWe-Farmle  ratio:  Conrp.  Grade  5
29VI) Multivariate analysis:  the role of gender, wealth, the education of parents, and the
availability  of schools.
Empirical specification
To disentangle the confounding  relationships between school enrollment and child,
household and community variables,  we now turn to a multivariate model which analyzes the
relationships simultaneously. The model, estimated country by country, is specified for child i in
household  j as
Eii*  =  3xMj+  +  +  63XW3j  +  72 X (Mj  x W2J)  + 73 X (Mij XW3j)
Gender  Wealth  Interaction of gender and wealth
+  XmXYmj + X)fXYfj  +  XhXHmj  +  XaXHaj
Education of adults  Characteristics  of head
+  p4,x(Mjj  x Ymj)  + gfx(Mjj  X Yfj)  +  phx(Mij  x  HBj) +  paX(Mij x Haj)
Interaction  of gender with adult and head variables
+  oc x  Xij  +  e(1)
Other characteristics
Eij*  is an unobserved variable whose observed counterpart, whether or not child i from household
j is currently in school, is defined as
E1 j =I  if  Eij*  >=O
= 0  otherwise.
Eij*  can be thought of as the underlying demand for child schooling and we only observe whether
it exceeds the threshold zero. The error term E  is assumed to follow the normal distribution and
therefore the model can be estimated using probit regression. The variable M is a dummy
30variable equal to one if the child is male, W2and W3 aIe dummy variables equal to one if the
child is from a household from the middle and rich wealth groups respectively (the poor group is
the reference group). Ym  and Yf are variables equal to the average years of schooling of the adult
males and the adult females in the household. 20 Hm  is a dummy variable equal to one if the head
of the household is male, and Ha  is a the age of the head of the household. The vector X includes
the child's age and age squared, as well as a dummy  variable equal to one if the household lives
in an urban area.
The effect of wealth and gender
Table 8 reports the marginal effects of being a male, being from the middle or
rich wealth group, and the interaction of the two. These marginal effects correspond to the
change in the percentage probability of a child being e.nrolled  as a result in a change in the
dummy  variable from zero to one, holding all other variables in the equation at their sample
mean. Marginal effects which are significant at the 5 percent level are indicated by an "s"
following the estimate. It is important to keep in mind that the relationship specified by the
probit model is non-linear and the effect is estimated for an "average" child in the sample.
Unlike the linear model this effect will be different for children with different background
characteristics-even  if no specific interaction term is specified. An implication of this is that
the marginal effect is estimated at different points in the distribution in different countries. Still,
the ultimate estimate of the marginal effects is a guide to what the effect is for the child with the
average characteristics in each country.
Since marginal effects can be difficult to interpret, the last six columns of Table 8 report
the predicted probability of being enrolled in school for the children in the sample. These
probabilities are evaluated at the means of the variables included in the regression but not shown
20  In the estimation, additional  variables equal to one if there are no adult males, or adult females, over
31Table 8: Marginal effects (xlOO)  of gender and wealth on the probability  of enrollment of 6-14 year olds, and predicted probabilities




Male  Middle  Richest  Middle  *Richest  Poor  Middle  Rich  Poor  Middle  Rich
Benin 1996  28.7 s  20.7 s  34.1 s  -1.2  -1.3  40.6  60.2  73.0  16.2  32.3  45.9
Burkina Faso 1992-93  14.8 s  9.1 s  27.2 s  -1.3  -3.5  30.7  39.7  56.0  16.3  24.3  41.7
Cameroon 1991  20.8 s  13.6 s  15.3 s  -5.3  0.9  83.9  90.2  94.6  61.5  77.8  81.1
C.A.R. 1994-95  29.3 s  12.7 s  20.8 s  0.0  -7.6  65.4  76.7  78.2  35.2  48.1  57.8
Chad 1998  21.5 s  6.9 s  14.3 s  -3.7  -1.6  42.3  45.7  55.8  20.8  26.8  33.5
Coted'lvoire  1994  23.6 s  15.9 s  21.1 s  -2:0  6.7  51.2  64.9  77.0  28.4  43.3  48.8
Ghana 1993  3.3  -0.6  2.9  6.0 s  9.4 s  78.7  84.2  90.1  75.1  74.5  78.4
Mali 1995-96  14.5 s  12.9 s  28.1 s  -1.5  -0.2  21.3  33.5  50.7  10.0  19.4  32.2
Niger 1992  16.9 s  4.4 s  11.9 s  -4.0 s  -4.6 s  26.4  26.3  35.0  7.1  10.5  16.8
Niger 1997  12.0 s  4.2  17.6 s  1.0  -3.1  23.4  29.6  39.3  12.0  15.3  27.3
Senegal 1992-93  19.7 s  14.9 s  18.5 s  -3.6  -0.9  29.3  41.4  47.6  12.7  24.1  26.5
Togo 1998  15.9 s  10.9 s  7.3 s  -3.2  10.3 s  75.3  82.5  90.2  57.2  70.4  66.5
Egypt 1992  5.8  14.8 s  13.9 s  -10.8 s  -12.1 s  81.3  87.9  89.2  73.8  90.9  92.3
Egypt 1995-96  7.7 s  13.3 s  15.4 s  -11.0 s  -16.0 s  83.4  88.9  92.5  72.9  90.5  95.3
Morocco 1992  31.1 s  41.3 s  43.6 s  -16.3 s  -13.9 s  51.9  78.3  87.3  22.1  64.8  75.1
Bangladesh 1993-94  -2.4  7.9 s  10.2 s  0.0  -3.7  65.8  74.1  73.4  68.4  76.4  78.9
Bangladesh 1996-97  -4.3  6.6 s  6.7 s  -1.0  6.1 s  67.9  74.1  81.4  72.6  79.2  79.5
India 1992-93  14.1 s  17.0 s  23.4 s  -2.8 s  -8.0 s  71.8  85.1  89.6  55.7  75.5  85.5
Nepal 1996  20.4 s  -3.2  14.7 s  0.6  -7.1  78.0  75.7  85.0  57.4  53.8  74.1
Pakistan 1990-91  27.9 s  20.5 s  36.3 s  -5.8  -26.6 s  62.7  76.3  76.8  34.4  55.4  75.4
Comoros  1996  14.6 s  19.9 s  22.7 s  -6.8  4.1  49.3  62.7  75.3  35.0  54.9  58.4
Kenya 1993  -1.9  -1.4  1.4  5.0 s  6.3 s  79.6  83.6  87.4  81.6  80.1  83.0
Kenya 1998  -0.5  -2.6 s  -1.2  2.5  4.6 s  90.2  90.3  93.9  90.7  87.9  89.6
Madagascar  1997  -0.3  4.8  22.8 s  -3.3  1.3  57.8  59.4  81.6  58.1  63.0  80.9
Malawi 1992  11.4 s  11.2 s  22.1 s  -4.0  1.8  62.1  69.2  83.6  50.4  62.0  73.7
Malawi 1996  8.3  3.5  3.8  -6.7  -3.9  95.0  93.4  95.4  87.2  91.3  91.8
Mozambique  1997  11.5  10.6 s  23.0 s  -5.7 s  -16.2 s  58.7  63.6  66.9  47.0  57.8  71.0
Namibia 1992  -1.4  -1.0  -3.6  0.9  5.3 s  88.9  88.8  91.9  90.3  89.3  86.8
Rwanda 1992  5.5  3.6  15.6 s  0.3  0.6  50.0  53.9  65.9  44.5  48.1  60.1
Tanzania 1991-92  -10.1  4.6 s  18.4 s  -2.0  -1.8  30.8  33.2  46.8  40.5  45.1  59.0
Tanzania 1996  6.7  10.6 s  20.0 s  -7.3 s  3.9  39.3  42.5  63.1  32.9  43.2  52.5
Uganda 1995  11.6 s  13.3 s  16.3 s  -8.1 s  -7.0  70.9  76.5  81.3  58.3  72.9  77.1
Zambia 1992  7.5  12.4 s  19.3 s  -2.2  4.0  69.4  80.5  92.1  60.3  75.3  84.7
Zambia 1996-97  6.9  4.9 s  18.8 s  -0.7  5.2  59.1  63.4  81.9  51.8  57.0  72.1
Zimbabwe 1994  6.3  3.5 s  6.1 s  -1.9  -1.7  91.7  93.2  95.9  84.2  88.9  92.7
Dominican Rep. 1991  4.0  17.0 s  26.7 s  -4.0  -6.7  60.5  75.2  86.8  55.9  75.1  88.3
Dominican Rep. 1996  -5.2 s  4.5 s  3.0 s  -0.2  1.5  86.6  94.8  95.7  95.3  98.6  98.1
Guatemala 1995  2.6  15.0 s  21.7 s  -3.3  -4.2  55.3  68.0  76.4  52.4  68.7  77.7
Haiti 1994-95  7.0  20.8 s  13.8 s  0.3  10.8 s  67.9  88.9  92.1  59.1  83.6  77.7
Nicaragua 1998  -1.1  10.8 s  10.6 s  -0.4  -2.6  72.1  84.2  83.2  73.6  85.5  86.5
Indonesia 1991  -2.7  11.0 s  13.2 s  -1.9  1.2  73.2  84.2  90.3  76.5  88.1  91.2
Indonesia 1994  0.6  5.7 s  7.2 s  0.5  2.7  85.6  92.2  95.7  84.8  91.3  93.5
Indonesia 1997  -3.0  3.7 s  5.5 s  0.9  1.6  87.0  92.5  95.2  90.7  94.2  96.0
Philippines  1993  -1.6  7.0 s  4.4 s  0.2  1.5  80.1  88.0  86.9  82.1  89.2  87.0
Philippines 1998  -0.1  4.4 s  4.3 s  0.8  2.7  86.4  92.2  94.2  86.5  91.6  91.9
Bolivia 1993-94  1.8  8.8 s  7.4 s  -3.0  0.2  86.7  93.8  96.1  84.1  94.6  94.9
Bolivia 1997  1.5  6.0 s  3.5 s  -3.3 s  2.3  92.6  96.8  98.8  90.0  97.7  96.3
Brazil 1996  -2.7  2.5 s  2.9 s  0.6  0.0  91.7  96.4  96.9  95.8  98.0  98.6
Brazil, NE 1991  -2.7  20.6 s  18.8 s  1.1  9.9  34.6  56.1  62.9  37.1  57.6  55.9
Brazil, NE 1996  -10.0 s  2.6 s  1.3  1.7  4.7  s  85.5  93.2  97.4  97.3  98.5  98.0
Colombia 1990  -1.0  4.9  5.4  1.3  -0.5  80.1  85.9  85.0  81.1  85.7  86.2
Colombia 1995  -5.0  4.4 s  3.4 s  -0.8  3.4 s  86.5  92.1  96.1  93.3  96.9  96.6
Peru 1991-92  2.8  3.8 s  -1.6  -0.9  .0.3  89.8  92.5  87.8  86.7  90.9  84.8
Peru 1996  2.8  2.9 s  1.4  -0.8  1.3  93.2  95.2  95.8  89.8  93.4  91.8
Kazakstan 1995  -4.4  -1.9  -5.5  0.7  2.2 s  95.8  94.1  95.7  99.2  98.3  96.5
Turkey 1993  10.6  6.1 s  7.1 s  -0.5  2.4  75.6  80.8  84.2  64.3  71.2  72.5
Uzbekistan 1996  -7.3  0.8  -1.0  0.5  0.0  91.3  93.6  89.4  98.7  99.0  98.3
Notes: Each marginal effect (change in the dummy from zero to one) is evaluated  at the means of all other regressors.
Significance  at the 5 percent level is indicated  by an "s".
Other variables in the regression are age and age squared,  average education of adult males in the household
(ages 20-64) and adult females in the household,  a dummy variable for whether  or not the head of the household is male,
the age of the head of the household, and a dummy variable for urban area.in this table (i.e. child characteristics, education of adults, characteristics of the head, urban
residence).
The coefficients on the dummy variable for being male confirm those reported earlier on
the bivariate  relationships. The effect is significant for all of the Western and Central African
countries (except for Ghana), for the North African countries (Egypt in 1995-96  and Morocco),
and for the South Asian countries (other than Bangladesh). In these countries, the effect of being
male increases the probability of being enrolled by between 14 percentage points (India) and 29
percentage  points (Central African Republic) except for Egypt where it is 7.7 percentage points.
In the other regions, the only countries with a significant female disadvantage are Comoros,
Malawi (although the effect is significant in 1992  but not so in 1996), and Uganda.
Virtually all countries have a significant (both in the statistical sense as well as in
magnitude) wealth gap in the percentage enrolled, especially comparing the poorest to the richest
group. The sole exceptions to this pattern are Ghana, Kenya, Malawi in 1996,  Namibia,
Colombia in 1990 (although the gaps are significant in the 1995 sample), Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan. The five largest rich-poor gaps occur in Mdorocco  (44 percentage points), Pakistan
(36), Benin (34), Mali (28), and Burkina Faso (27). In two of these (Morocco and Pakistan)
being male significantly mitigates (but not completely)  the wealth gap, although this is not the
case in the other countries. For example, in Pakistan, the marginal effect of being in the richest
group is 43 percentage points, but if the child is male this is reduced by 14 percentage points.
The other countries where the effect of being male significantly  reduces the wealth gap are
Egypt, India, Morocco, Mozambique  and Pakistan. Typically though, the wealth gap is not
mitigated by being male.
The results from Table 8 are derived from a pooled sample of urban and rural
households, and include a dummy variable equal to one for urban residence. As discussed in
which  to take  this  average,  are included.  In those  cases,  the average  is set to zero.
32Filmer and Pritchett (1998) the principal components  method of deriving  the asset index may
overstate  the difference between urban and rural areas, ascribing more rural households into the
poor category than would a ranking based on consumption  expenditures. If the dummy variable
does not capture this difference  the results may mis-state the interpretation of the wealth groups.
In order to check the robustness, all these results were repeated using only households in rural
areas. The results are virtually unchanged compared to the pooled sample (see Annex Table 8a).
The magnitudes of the effects are all roughly of the same order, and the pattern of significance is
virtually the same. One interesting difference is in Morocco where in rural areas the effect of
being male no longer mitigates the wealth gap.21
The effect of the schooling of adults
As described in equation (1), the schooling of adult members of the household was
included in the empirical  multivariate specification. The two variables used are the average
years of schooling of 20 to 64 year old females, and the average years of schooling of 20 to 64
year old males.
The first two columns of Table 9 report the estimates of the marginal effect of increasing
the average years of schooling of female or male adults in the household by one year on the
percentage  probability of being enrolled. 22 In practically all cases the effect is statistically
significantly positive. In some of the cases where the effect is insignificant it is likely to be
because there is not much variation in the data, either on the side of the education of the adults
(e.g. females in Benin and Burkina Faso where their attainment is consistently  very low) or on
the side of the enrollment of children (e.g. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where enrollment is
consistently very high). Among the countries where the marginal effect is significant there is
21
Another  alternative  specification  includes  the maximum  years  of schooling  completed  by adult  males  and
adult  females  in  the household.  The  results  on gender  and  wealth  are not substantially  altered  by this
change.
33Table 9: Marginal effects (xlOO)  of adult education on the probability  of enrollment of 6-14 year olds, urban and rural areas
(Probit results  for selected variables)-using  MEAN years of adult schooling
Interaction: Male'Average adult  P-value (test of equality of adult
Average adult years of schooling  years  of school  education parameters)
Female adults  Male adults  Female  adults  Male adults  Girls  Boys
Benin 1996  0.2  2.1 s  2.6 s  1.3 s  0.004 s  0.584
Burkina Faso 1992-93  0.6  2.2 s  2.3 s  0.8  0.005 s  0.814
C.A.R. 1994-95  4.3 s  3.2 s  -1.2  -0.2  0.128  0.876
Cameroon 1991  6.0 s  3.5 s  -1.5 s  0.4  0.021 s  0.539
Chad 1998  6.1 s  4.5 s  -1.3  0.1  0.034 s  0.753
Cote d'Ivoire 1994  2.3 s  2.7 s  1.4 s  1.2 s  0.548  0.855
Ghana 1993  1.6 s  2.3 s  0.0  -0.5  0.063  0.491
Mali 1995-96  2.0 s  3.2 s  1.3 s  0.2  0.097  0.936
Niger 1992  2.2  s  1.5 s  -0.7  0.4  0.305  0.530
Niger 1997  3.0 s  2.0 s  -0.5  0.4  0.048 s  0.804
Senegal 1992-93  3.9 s  3.6 s  -1.1  0.0  0.732  0.276
Togo 1998  2.2 s  2.3  s  0.4  0.6  0.877  0.612
Egypt 1992  1.6 s  1.5 s  -0.9 s  0.0  0.666  0.006 s
Egypt 1995-96  1.4 s  1.1 s  -0.4  -0.1  0.284  0.829
Morocco  1992  0.1  2.2  s  1.9 s  0.7  0.007 s  0.331
Bangladesh 1993-94  0.9 s  2.1 s  1.5 s  0.2  0.015 s  0.875
Bangladesh 1996-97  0.4  2.1 s  1.1 s  -0.3  0.001 s  0.477
India 1992-93  3.4 s  2.8 s  -1.5 s  0.0  0.010 s  0.000 s
Nepal 1996  4.1  s  4.0 s  -3.2 s  -0.4  0.908  0.009 s
Pakistan 1990-91  4.9 s  3.3 s  -2'.6 s  0.4  0.020 s  0.044 s
Comoros  1996  2.2 s  2.6 s  -0.6  -0.4  0.651  0.468
Kenya 1993  1.8 s  1.0 s  0.0  -0.3  0.031 s  0.004 s
Kenya 1998  1.0 s  0.6 s  0.5 s  0.2  0.090  0.003 s
Madagascar  1997  3.8 s  3.3 s  0.9  1.2 s  0.465  0.778
Malawi 1992  2.2  s  3.3 s  0.5  0.0  0.113  0.394
Malawi 1996  1.0 s  0.6  0.4  -0.4  0.478  0.094
Mozambique  1997  5.1 s  1.9 s  -1.2  0.7  0.017 s  0.417
Namibia 1992  1.8 s  0.7 s  0.2  -0.2  0.001 s  0.000 s
Rwanda 1992  2.Q s  1.6 s  -0.9  0.0  0.509  0.373
Tanzania 1991-92  0.6  1.7 s  0.6  0.1  0.081  0.454
Tanzania 1996  1.9 s  1.8 s  0.2  -0.3  0.919  0.338
Uganda 1995  2.8 s  1.4 s  -0.8 s  0.4  0.003 s  0.829
Zambia 1992  2.0 s  1.7 s  0.9 s  -0.2  0.634  0.016 s
Zambia 1996-97  3.2 s  2.8 s  -0.4  -0.2  0.389  0.609
Zimbabwe  1994  1.5 s  0.5 s  -0.1  0.1  0.004 s  0.026 s
Dominican  Republic 1991  2.4 s  0.1  -0.2  1.3 s  0.000 s  0.284
Dominican  Republic 1996  0.5 s  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.063  0.000 s
Guatemala 1995  2.9 s  2.7 s  -0.1  -0.1  0.761  0.699
Haiti 1994-95  1.5 s  1.4 s  0.9  0.5  0.864  0.521
Nicaragua  1998  2.4 s  1.0 s  -0.5 s  0.0  0.000 s  0.021 s
Indonesia 1991  1.1 s  0.9 s  0.1  0.0  0.582  0.427
Indonesia 1994  1.0 s  0.9 s  0.2  0.2  0.597  0.724
Indonesia 1997  0.9 s  0.6 s  (.1  0.1  0.171  0.167
Philippines 1993  1.4 s  0.7 s  (1.2  0.3  0.030 s  0.036 s
Philippines 1998  0.9 s  0.6 s  0.2  0.3  0.288  0.755
Bolivia 1993-94  0.6 s  0.3 s  -0.4  -0.1  0.422  0.784
Bolivia 1997  0.3 s  0.1  -0.1  0.2  0.107  0.972
Brazil 1996  0.6 s  0.2 s  -0(.1  0.1  0.037 s  0.245
Brazil, Northeast  1991  1.9 s  1.0  0.8  1.1 s  0.277  0.478
Brazil, Northeast  1996  0.7 s  0.3  0.7 s  0.3  0.360  0.041 s
Colombia 1990  1.6 s  0.5  -0.3  0.5  0.052  0.700
Colombia 1995  0.7 s  0.7 s  0.6 s  0.2  0.911  0.113
Peru 1991-92  0.5 s  0.4 s  -0.3  0.1  0.435  0.374
Peru 1996  0.5 s  0.5 s  -0.2 s  -0.1  0.720  0.076
Kazakstan 1995  0.3  0.0  ().1  0.2  0.387  0.711
Turkey 1993  2.6 s  2.3 s  -1.1 s  -0.1  0.564  0.158
Uzbekistan  1996  0.6  0.3  (0.2  0.1  0.512  0.355
Notes: Each marginal effect (or change in the dummy from zero to one) is evaluated  at the means of all other regressors.
Significant  difference from zero at the 5 percent  level is indicated by an "s".  Other variables in the regression are age and age squared,
a dummy variable for gender, dummy variables  for wealth group, and a dummy variable for urban  area.
P-value reported is the p-value of the two-sided test for equality between the underlying probit coefficients on male and female education.quite a range in the estimates of the effect of female education: from under a one percentage
point increase in the probability of enrollment to a 6 percentage point increase (in Cameroon). A
separate specifications  which includes the maximum  years of schooling  instead of the average
was estimated and the results are qualitatively,  and almost quantitatively, unchanged (see Annex
Table 9b).
The third and fourth columns of Table 9 investigate  the hypothesis that the education of
the male and female adults differs according to the gender of the child. If it were true that adult
female education had a larger impact on girls children than on boy children, then one would
expect the coefficient on the interaction term between male and years of schooling of adult
females to be negative and significant. This is true in 9 countries: Cameroon, Egypt (1992),
India, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Turkey and Uganda. In 11 of the countries there is the
opposite result, that is the schooling of adult females in the household has a significantly larger
positive impact on boys than it does on girls. These countries are Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Colombia (1995), Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya (1993), Morocco, Mali, Northeast Brazil (1996),
Z7ambia  (1992). Some of these may be explained by the very low level of adult female schooling
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh 1993-94, Morocco) where the effect of adult female education
was insignificant.
The interaction between gender of the child and education of male adults is rarely
significant. In the 5 countries where there is a significant relationship (Benin, Cote d'Ivoire,
Madagascar, Dominican  Republic 1991, Northeast Brazil 1991)  the results imply that education
of adult males positively increases the enrollment  of boys more than it increases the enrollment
of girls.
22 The results  on the characteristics  of the head  of the household  are included  in Annex  Table  9a.
34The fifth and sixth columns of Table 9 report the p-values of tests for equality between
the coefficient on female education and the effect of male education for boys and girls. 23 A p-
value of less than 0.05 indicates that the coefficients are different from one-another  with 95
percent confidence. The results here provide some support for the notion frequently put forward
that the effect of education of women has a stronger impact than that of men in stopping the
cycle of low education outcomes (among other things). In this analysis the coefficient for
females is significantly larger than that of males in B:razil,,Cameroon,  Chad, Dominican Republic
(1991), India, Kenya (1993), Mozambique,  Namibia,  Nicaragua, Niger (1997), Philippines
(1993), Uganda, Zimbabwe, Pakistan.
In some cases the difference is significant but implies that the effect of the years of
schooling of adult males is larger than that of females. This is the case in Bangladesh, Benin,
Burkina Faso, and Morocco. This type of result is usually explained as an effect of income (i.e.
male education is more closely related to household income than is female education and male
education is merely picking up this fact) but such an argument  is less valid here because these
effects control for a household's wealth status. Of course, to the extent that the wealth measure
is imperfect,  the usual caveat would still hold. An alternative specification which includes all of
the individual  assets instead of the wealth groups as derived from the asset index was carried out
as well.  This approach will allow the asset variables to explain as much of the variation in
enrollment "as possible" reducing the chance of overstating the impact of other variables (e.g.
adult education). While the coefficients on the female and male education terms are not
substantially  altered the test for the equality of coefficients is no longer significant for girls in 5
of the countries, and that for boys in 1 of the countries (see Annex Table 9c).
23 The test is carried  out  on the underlying  probit  coefficients.
35The effect of the presence of schools
The last relationship  reported  here is that between  educational  enrollment  and the
presence  of schools within the community.  The sample is restricted  here to rural settings as
identifying  "communities"  in urban settings for this  purpose is very difficult.  In addition,  the
number of countries for which  this relationship  can be estimated  is much lower  as community
questionnaires  were not carried out in the majority of the DHS (the results  are available  for 21
surveys in 19 countries).
The estimating  equation  given in (1) is augmented with a dummy variable  equal to one if
there is a primary  school in the community,  a dummy variable  equal to one if there  is a primary
and a secondary school  in the community,  and interaction  terms between  these and the dummy
for male gender. 24 These school presence  variables  are constructed  from the response  by the
community  survey respondent  to the questions  "is there a primary school  in this  community"  and
"is there a secondary  school in this community".  Although  the children  under analysis  (ages 6 to
14) are not likely to be  attending  secondary school, the access to secondary places  may have an
impact  on primary  schooling  and the dummy variables  for secondary  school  are therefore
included  in the multivariate  analysis  (see Lavy, 1997).
In addition  to these school  facility variables,  the equation  includes  a set of community
infrastructure  variables  in order to ensure that a relationship  with school  presence  is not simply
reflecting  the  fact that communities  with more infrastructure  in general, including  schools, may
tend to have higher enrollment.  While  the exact list of variables  varies from  survey to survey,
the typical list includes:  a dummy variable  equal to one if the nearest  urban center  is less than 10
kilometers  away; a set of dummy variables  each equal to one if there is a post office,  a local
24 In addition a dumrny  (and interaction)  equal to one if there is a secondary  school, but no primary school,
in the community  is included for the countries  where this occurs. This is a very rare occurrence even in
countries  where the relationship can be estimated and the results are not reported here.
36market, a bank, cinema,  public transport in the commn.unity;  dummy variables each equal to one if
there is a pharmacy, a health center, a hospital, or a clinic in the community.
Table 10 reports the marginal effects of the gender and wealth variables,  as well as of the
school presence variables. The results on the gender and wealth variables are extremely similar
to those when the presence of schools is not included in the regression (i.e. compare these
estimates  to those in Annex Table 8a). The magnitu(les  and the pattern of significance are very
close. The results on the school presence variables suggest that the presence of primary schools
has a significant impact on the enrollment of 6 to 14 year olds in some countries (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Madagascar,  Niger, and Zimbabwe). The magnitude of this
effect reaches high levels in some countries. For example, children aged 6 to 14 in rural Benin
are 25 percentage points more likely to be enrolled if they live in a village with a primary school
than if they live in a village without a primary school. In Cote d'Ivoire the increase is 18
percentage points and in Mali it is 21 percentage  points.  In the other countries with a statistically
significant relationship, the increase is smaller (ranging from 5.4 percentage points in Zimbabwe
to 13 percentage  points in Burkina Faso).
The effect of the presence of both a primary and a secondary  school on enrollment is
significant in 7 of the samples studied (Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, India, Madagascar, Niger
and Zimbabwe). Again, there is a large variation in the magnitude of the estimated effect: it
ranges from 56 percentage points in Niger (1997) to a much smaller 12 percentage points in
Burkina Faso, and about 9 percentage points in Bolivia, India and Zimbabwe. 25
What conclusions can one draw from these estimates regarding the relationship between
"access" to schools and enrollment? The data are clearly limited: the measure of access is a
poorly measured one as there may be large spatial heterogeneity in the survey communities  (i.e.
some communities  may be tightly centered around one area with a school whereas others might
37Table 10: Marginal  effects of(x100) gender, wealth, and the presence  of primary and secondary  schools in the community
on the probability  of enrollment of 6-14 year olds, rural areas (Probit results  for selected variables)
Primary  Male
and  Male  Primary
Primary  seconda  Primary  and
Male *  Male  school  ry  school  seconda
Male  Middle  Richest  Middle  Richest  only  schools  only  ry
Benin 1993  35.0  s  12.0 s  22.5  s  1.9  -4.4  25.2  s  49.5  s  -17.3  s  -14.1 s
Burkina Faso 1992-93  15.5  s  5.2  s  10.1  s  -0.9  9.0  12.5 s  12.2  s  2.4  -0.2
Cameroon 1991  33.6  s  9.1  s  11.5  -4.3  14.8  0.1  . -0.1
Chad 1998  17.7  s  2.7  6.4  -0.9  -2.0  21.0  s  14.3  2.6  2.4
Cote d'lvoire 1994  27.2  s  15.4 s  19.8 s  -2.7  7.4  17.9 s  -3.8  -3.4  31.0
Mali 1995-96  11.6  s  5.3  s  13.4 s  -0.6  0.9  20.9  s  . -0.6
Niger 1992  10.3  s  1.6  8.6  -2.0  -4.3  s  9.6  s  3.7  0.5  2.4
Niger 1997  10.3  s  0.6  6.0  1.4  1.7  14.4 s  56.3  s  1.1  -0.3
Senegal 1992-93  12.6  s  6.8  s  -7.2  -2.2  25.4  -2.9  -8.2  -1.8  -0.7
Morocco 1992  37.6  s  36.9  s  54.4  s  -4.9  -10.7  8.6  -10.1  1.4  1.1
Bangladesh 1993-94  -9.6  6.8  s  10.6  s  1.6  -6.6  2.4  3.4  8.4  s  9.1  s
Bangladesh 1996-97  -4.2  4.8  s  4.4  0.6  8.2  s  4.8  4.7  1.3  2.3
India 1992-93  18.9  s  14.6 s  21.0  s  0.3  -0.6  4.4  9.0  s  -1.2  -6.2  s
Madagascar 1992  9.4  10.8 s  27.6 s  -5.0  -12.5  s  14.9  s  21.1  s  -7.6  -1.1
Tanzania 1991-92  -6.7  2.0  19.7 s  1.3  -4.3  6.7  -0.5  0.0  4.2
Uganda 1995  12.6  s  12.0 s  17.1  s  -6.6  s  -13.4  s  -0.5  4.9  -0.5  -7.9
Zimbabwe 1994  8.8  s  3.9  s  10.1  s  -2.5  -38.4  5.4  s  9.1  s  -0.3  -10.8  s
Dominican Rep. 1991  -15.2  22.0  s  42.9  s  -16.7  -27.7  2.3  11.5  7.9  -3.6
Haiti 1994-95  2.2  21.9  s  23.4  s  1.9  -28.3  7.5  8.9  -2.5  1.4
Philippines  1993  -8.1  6.9  s  5.7  s  0.5  1.6  4.0  4.8  -1.5  -2.3
Bolivia  1993-94  4.6  8.8  s  13.5  s  0.9  -88.8  s  4.7  9.4  s  0.1  -1.8
Notes: Each marginal effect (change in the dummy from zero to one) is evaluated  at the means of all other regressors.
Significance  at the 5 percent level is indicated by an "s".
Other variables in the regression are age and age squared, average education  of adult males in the household
(ages 20-64) and adult females in the household,  a dummy variable for whether or not the head of the household
is male, the age of the head of the household,  and a set of community infrastructure  variables (e.g. presence  of a
post office, a cinema, health facilities, distance to the nearest  urban center)be highly dispersed). Moreover, this measure of access records only the "presence" of a school
and contains no information on the quality of that school: a single room with a roof and no tables
or chairs is recorded in the same way as a solid structure  with many rooms with blackboards in
each. In addition, schools may be purposively located  by decision makers to locations where
enrollments are low in order to boost them. The regression will then be understate the impact cf
schools on enrollment.
Nevertheless,  the results do suggest that in some countries access, even crudely
described,  matters for enrollments. The effect of the presence of a school can even be larger than
going from the poorest to the richest group in the society. However, among the countries studied
here, this is not the typical case.  The crude measure of access is both small and insignificant in
most of the countries, especially  when compared to the magnitude of the relationship to w ealth.
The last two columns of Table 9 report the coefficients and the significance  of the
interaction of the male dummy  and the presence of schools variables. These therefore test
whether the presence of schools has a different effect for boys than for girls. There are four
cases that emerge in these data. First, in the majority of cases the interaction is small and
insignificant: the presence of schools effects boys and girls equally. Second, in Benin the
interaction terms are both negative and significant. This means that the presence of schools has a
larger impact on the enrollment  of girls than it does on the enrollment of boys. The rough
number suggested by these estimates is that the presence of a primary school in Benin increases
the probability that a girl is enrolled by 25 percentage  points, but increases the probability of a
boy being enrolled by 8 percentage points (25-17). This is admittedly a rough calculation as it is
derived from summing the marginal effects. Nonetheless it reveals the orders of magnitudes.
Benin is the only country that follows this pattern. Third, in India and Zimbabwe  the presence of
a primary and secondary school has a larger effect on girls than it does on boys, although  the
25 The  effect  of the presence  of schools  is not substantially  altered  when  including  all  the assets  in the
38magnitudes  in question are much smaller. Last, in the first survey in Bangladesh (1993-94)  the
presence of primary, and primary and secondary  schools,  have positive and significant effects on
the enrollment  of boys but an insignificant  effect on girls. Again the magnitudes in question are
relatively small and, perhaps more importantly,  had been wiped out by the time of the second
survey (1996-97).
VII) Conclusions
This paper set out to document  and analyze gender disparities in education. The results
confirm  prior studies that there are some countries where a female disadvantage in education
outcomes is a major problem. This disadvantage  appears to be less related to measures of a
country's income level, income growth, or spending on primary education than to a fairly strict
regional breakdown, although it is somewhat  related to the level of income inequality within a
country. The large female disadvantage exists in only few countries outside of the Western and
Central Africa, North Africa, and South Asia regions. Moreover, the extent of the female
disadvantage varies by the wealth of the household.
Even in countries with a relatively small gender gap there might be large inequalities. In
many of the countries with a very small female disadvantage (or even with a small female
advantage) the gaps between outcomes for the rich and the poor can be very large. Moreover, in
some countries wealth and gender interact to create a very large female disadvantage among  the
poorest in society (for example in India). This study highlights the necessity to consider wealth
and gender gaps simultaneously.
regression  instead of the wealth groups as derived from the asset index (Annex Table lOa).
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